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The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how 
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the 
broadest possible sense of the term 
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HUMANS IN A NEUROTECHNOLOGICAL WORLD 
Science and technology have been prominent factors in the cul-
tural changes that brought humankind from the stone age to the infor-
mation age. Within those approximately two hundred thousand years, 
the last few millennia show an explosive, accelerating change in human 
societies. Science and technology, promoted by favorable geographical 
and political circumstances, introduced constant innovations that dra-
matically impacted every aspect of a human life. Technological devel-
opment has pushed human understanding of nature from a manifest im-
age of the world, where intuition is the dominant avenue to explain phe-
nomena, towards an increasingly scientific one (Sellars, 1963). Thanks 
to growingly sophisticated technological instruments, the forces of na-
ture have been observed, measured and ultimately explained by increas-
ingly predictive scientific theories. Numerous phenomena, once ex-
plained by appealing to intuitive principles, have been progressively 
‘naturalized’, bringing them into conformity with a scientific view of 
the world. This progressive naturalization has not only been affecting 
our account of the natural world, but even the image we have of our-
selves. Advances in neurobiology and neurophysiology, aided by the 
increasing availability of modern imaging technology, from optical mi-
croscopy to magnetic resonance imaging, brought about a detailed 
knowledge of the brain functioning, allowing to investigate and under-
stand the human mind–or at least parts of it–from a scientific stand-
point. In the 21st century, functional neuroimaging technologies and 
neuro-stimulation methods provide the possibility to monitor (Poldrack 
& Farah, 2015), and to a certain extent manipulate (Miocinovic, 
Somayajula, Chitnis, & Vitek, 2013), brain activity. Not only can we 
infer certain mental states from observing the brain, but we can interfere 
with them by intervening in the nervous system. 
Neuroscience and neurotechnology have profoundly influenced 
what could be called our ‘self-image’. They did it in at least two senses. 
At a personal level, with their positively disruptive–and creative– 
power, have led to questioning traditional views of our minds and 
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selves, ultimately reshaping some of our conceptions of human nature. 
Neuroimaging and neurostimulation technologies brought a profound 
understanding of the structure and functioning of the brain, shedding 
considerable light on the relationship between neural mechanisms and 
the mental states they represent (Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013). Not 
only the way we conceive ourselves, but even human self-experience 
can sometimes be influenced. Neurotechnologies like Brain-computer 
interfaces and brain stimulators have been recognized to affect the way 
we phenomenologically perceive ourselves. BCIs can alter one’s sense 
of agency and induce self-misattribution of action (Haselager, 2013), 
while brain stimulators (e.g. DBS) might change one’s personality and 
self-recognition (Witt, Kuhn, Timmermann, Zurowski, & Woopen, 
2013a). At societal level, neuroscience and neurotechnology affected 
some of our established social practices and cultural values. Neurosci-
entific discoveries about the brain’s functioning have contributed to the 
questioning of deeply entrenched intuitions about ourselves as free 
agents (Benjamin Libet, 1985; Mele, 2011), ultimately influencing so-
cial and legal practices of attribution of responsibility and blame (A. L. 
Roskies, 2012; Shadlen & Roskies, 2012). Additionally, brain reading 
methods seem to threaten the last of our private spaces, making our 
mind publicly accessible and thereby generating a number of societal 
issues regarding privacy (Gilead, 2015; Shen, 2013) and data security 
(Ienca, Haselager, & Emanuel, 2017). 
Challenging assumptions and beliefs is in itself a valuable prod-
uct of good scientific research. However, large part of our society relies 
on values and intuitions that might sometimes seem to collide with the 
implications of a hard-scientific vision of the world. A classic example 
concerns legal systems where the image of a responsibly deciding, 
freely acting person, could be perceived to clash with the materialistic 
picture that emerges from neuroscientific research. Also, there are val-
ues and feelings people simply care about, and that might be worth pre-
serving in some form. This possible tension between neuroscience and 
human self-image can be further aggravated by a lack of proper com-
munication. Neuroscience and neurotechnology, both in academia and 
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in the private sector, are sometimes unable to give a clear picture of 
their products to non-experts. Those stakeholders, from mass media, to 
governmental agencies, to private tax-paying citizens, are typically fun-
ders and ultimately beneficiaries of the products of that research. Insuf-
ficient reciprocal understanding creates a misalignment that is detri-
mental for both neuroscience and society. On the one hand, neurosci-
ence might partially lose society’s trust, resulting in reduced funding 
and general support; on the other hand, society might miss out on im-
portant clinical and practical opportunities that current and future re-
search have the potential to offer. 
In this thesis, we will discuss three cases where this possible 
tension between neuroscience and human self-image emerges clearly. 
Our work aims to contribute to the creation and stimulation of a recip-
rocal and constructive dialogue between neuroscience and society, in 
order to recognize, prevent and potentially address those cases where 
scientific results and societal interests are at risk of misalignment. It 
does so by presenting the results of a philosophical approach that aims 
to combine a questioning, societally reflective attitude, typical of the 
humanities, with the clarity and rigor that characterizes hard science. 
Ultimately, we aim to obtain two things: first, an encompassing, prac-
tically oriented understanding of the ethical, legal and societal implica-
tions of neuroscience and neurotechnology; second, a set of conceptual 
tools and criteria for the development of scientifically informed ethical 
guidelines. 
 
WHAT PHILOSOPHY CAN–AND SHOULD–DO 
A humanities perspective in general, and in particular philoso-
phy, are essential to get an encompassing understanding of what it 
means to be human in the age of neurotechnology. Scientific and tech-
nological advances should be kept where possible aligned with funda-
mental values, beliefs and social norms that are foundational to our so-
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ciety. The new millennium gave birth to a discipline that lies at the in-
tersection between neuroscience and philosophy: neuroethics. Neuro-
ethics is not limited, as the suffix “-ethics” might seem to suggest, to 
ethical discussion, but engages in a constructive and informed dialogue 
between neuroscientific progress and societal needs. This thesis can be 
located within such discipline, as it tries to address the diverse ethical, 
legal and societal implications of current neuroscience and neurotech-
nology. Our approach joins philosophical reflection with an as-rigor-
ous-as-possible scientific attitude. We aim to raise awareness and to 
promote academic and public debate on the potential implications of 
neuroscience and neurotechnology. As neuroethicists, we understand–
and use– philosophy as ancilla scientiarum, a science’s companion. 
Philosophy, at its best, has been proven good at that task in many ways. 
First, philosophy is an effective tool for reasoning, to empower scien-
tific reasoning and facilitate a clearer understanding of presuppositions 
underlying scientific research, the interpretation of empirical results, 
the precise formulation of hypotheses and ultimately the production of 
sounder scientific theories. Second, philosophy provides powerful eth-
ical tools. Over two and a half millennia, the philosophical tradition 
developed a rich framework of principles, concepts and methods that 
can provide insightful guidelines for ethical scientific practice and re-
sponsible use of technology. Third, philosophy facilitates reciprocal un-
derstanding and promotes effective communication between science 
and society. Considered as a wide minded approach that provides a su-
per partes, encompassing perspective, philosophy provides instruments 
and practical suggestions for an effective use of communicative lan-
guage, preventing misunderstandings and misconceptions while assist-
ing in the translation of scientific findings into societally relevant re-
sults. Furthermore, philosophical reflection helps framing scientific 
findings in a wider cultural background, allowing a better understand-
ing of the many historical factors that can affect those findings or be 
affected by them. 
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THREE TOPICS IN CURRENT NEUROETHICS 
There are three major topics that are treated in this thesis, and a 
total of five chapters. Four of those have been published already, while 
the last one has been recently submitted. In this section, after a brief 
presentation of the content of each chapter, we delve into each of the 
three topics we treated, discussing them with further detail. Each topic 
represents a different case where knowledge and practical possibilities 
created by neuroscience and neurotechnology conflicted, to different 
extents, with that set of values, feelings and beliefs that we called hu-
man self-image. The first two chapters of this volume are dedicated to 
Deep Brain Stimulation and how to make sense of the changes in the 
sense of self that in some cases have accompanied its use. The very first 
chapter was published on “AJOB Neuroscience”, and obtained a large 
number of open peer commentaries. The second chapter consists in an 
attempt to answer the numerous questions that were raised by our peers 
after its publication, and was published by Cambridge Scholars Pub-
lishing as a book chapter in a volume called “Frontiers in Neuroethics”. 
The third chapter regards free will, one of the classic philosophical de-
bates that has been relatively recently refreshed by neuroscientific re-
search and neurotechnology. There, we suggest that a number of em-
pirical results in the study of voluntary action, due to the way concepts 
are defined and operationalized, might not be usable to draw any kind 
of relevant conclusion about freedom of will. The chapter was pub-
lished as an original paper in “Neuroethics”. The fourth and fifth chap-
ters are about brain reading technology and its potential capacity for 
mind reading. There, we investigate what reading a brain might mean 
in theory and in practice, and what the main societally relevant impli-
cations could be. We provide a framework composed of five evaluation 
criteria in order to support a practically informed assessment of the po-
tential consequences of brain reading technology in those scenarios 
where mental privacy might be a concern. 
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Neurotechnology and the self 
The first case we discuss in this volume, in chapters 1 and 2, 
concerns Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and its potential neuropsycho-
logical side effects. DBS is a remarkable technological achievement 
that presents interesting ethical implications and has been recently 
drawing the attention of several different specialists, from clinicians to 
philosophers. This technology, reminding of a cardiac pacemaker, pro-
vides a direct electrical stimulation of subcortical brain areas. One or 
two electrodes are surgically implanted about ten centimeters deep into 
the brain and successively connected to a battery driven device that pro-
duces electrical potentials with customizable characteristics. This pro-
cedure seems to be able to substantially address a vast range of neuro-
logical (e.g. Parkinson’s, Essential Tremor) (Fukaya & Yamamoto, 
2015) and psychiatric (e.g. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Major De-
pression, addictions) (Williams & Okun, 2013) symptoms. Yet, despite 
the remarkable efficacy in general, psychological (mal)adaptations to 
the treatment might occur (Clausen, 2010; Klaming & Haselager, 2013; 
Mackenzie, 2011; Schermer, 2011; Witt et al., 2008; Witt, Kuhn, 
Timmermann, Zurowski, & Woopen, 2013b), in addition to operative 
and post-operative surgical complications (Doshi, 2011). As the litera-
ture extensively reports, the vast majority of the side effects can be usu-
ally addressed during the post-operative follow-up by optimizing the 
stimulator’s parameters (Clausen, 2010; Goodman & Alterman, 2012). 
Nevertheless, in some cases the psychological well-being of the treated 
subjects cannot be optimally preserved, and setting the stimulation pa-
rameters might be poorly effective. According to some authors 
(e.g.(Clausen, 2010)), psycho–social effects have the largest impact 
(quantitatively speaking) among the reported side effects. These effects 
could be caused by the stimulation itself, but perhaps also, or even in-
stead, be a consequence of a psychological reaction, where the patients 
might experience discomfort in relation to the knowledge of having an 
implanted stimulator. In particular, changes in self-perception have 
been reported, generally expressed by the feeling of not being oneself 
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anymore. What we know from the literature is that there have been sim-
ilar reports in the context of cardiac pacemaker implantation (Beery & 
Baas, 1996; Wingate, 1986), where the central nervous system and the 
cognitive states of a subject are less likely to be directly affected in 
comparison to the DBS case. This can be interpreted as corroborating 
the idea that the psychological component of these effects could bear 
some actual relevance. 
Our hypothesis is that to the extent this phenomenon involves a 
psychological component, the endorsement of a certain conceptual 
framework could play a role in determining a patient’s self-perception 
and self-interpretation. Considering this possibility, we evaluate how 
various conceptual schemes might play a role in self-related maladap-
tation to DBS treatment. In particular, we hypothesize that a “braincen-
tric” materialism, sometimes also referred to as ‘neuroessentialism’ 
(Reiner, 2012; A. Roskies, 2002), might contribute to facilitate those 
maladaptations. Such a theoretical stance seems likely to be promoted 
by both the scientific explanation of the pathological situation and per-
haps also by the specific way such explanation is delivered in a clinical 
context. It has been shown (Bering, 2006; Johnson, 2008) that the vast 
majority of the general public believes in some sort of dualistic ontol-
ogy where mind and body (brain) are separated substances. We suggest 
that whereas a dualistic approach could promote a good acceptance of 
neurotechnological implantations, a braincentric materialism might 
more likely evoke discomforting ideas and consequent maladaptation 
to treatments. The idea is that from a strongly dualistic perspective the 
brain and its functioning are limitedly involved in determining the na-
ture of your mind and self. Rather, for a braincentric materialism the 
brain is all what you, as a person, are. So, whether in the former case 
one could feel comfortably shielded against brain stimulations because 
no electrical stimulation will touch one’s ‘genuine self’, in the latter 
one might feel exposed to a personal disruption, for a stimulator directly 
affects the brain, i.e. the very essence of what a person is. 
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In order to address the issue at stake, different, yet still scientif-
ically sound, accounts of the mind-brain relationship could be sug-
gested by doctors/nurses to patients during their communication regard-
ing DBS and its effects. In particular, we suggest that embodied em-
bedded cognition (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; van Dijk, Kerkhofs, van 
Rooij, & Haselager, 2008) might be useful in conveying the idea that 
the brain is one of several elements (e.g. body and environment) that 
are involved in the constitution of the whole phenomenon of mind, per-
sonality and self (Shoda, LeeTiernan, & Mischel, 2002). However, un-
burdening the brain of its central role of "mind bearer" is probably just 
one of the possible ways for improving the personal, social and cultural 
acceptance of a device and to include it in a wider image of the self that 
incorporates contextual and technological elements. Clearly, the evalu-
ation of the role of general conceptual schemes in the occurrence or 
prevention of psychological maladaptation in patients undergoing 
DBS, is just starting. 
 
Neuroscience and free will 
The second topic we discuss in this volume (chapter 3) concerns 
the implications of neuroscientific research for our understanding of 
free will. Freedom of will has been classically debated in philosophy 
and represents one of the aspects of human nature that bears among the 
most important societal implications. In particular, legal doctrine relies 
on a certain concept of free will in order to ground the attribution, and 
establish the extent, of individual responsibility. Neuroscientific studies 
have introduced a number of new elements that often have been inter-
preted as precluding the existence of a capacity to make free, responsi-
ble choices. One of the first, and still most emblematic, studies is the 
so-called Libet experiment (Shoda et al., 2002). His paradigm is widely 
accepted and used in contemporary neuroscience research (Fried, 
Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008), 
though both the validity of the empirical methodology (Bode et al., 
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2014; Pockett & Purdy, 2010; A. L. Roskies, 2012; Schlegel et al., 
2013) and the soundness of the theoretical basis of the study of neural 
correlates of voluntary action have been extensively discussed (Ebert 
& Wegner, 2011; Nachev & Hacker, 2014; Nachev & Husain, 2010; A. 
L. Roskies, 2010a). 
The way the concept of ‘free action’ has been interpreted and 
operationalized within such experimental traditions, leaves ample room 
for discussion. Specifically, we question whether what Libet et al. (B 
Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1982) called a “self-initiated voluntary act” 
should be taken as a prototypical free action, i.e. the type of free action 
that is commonly discussed in societally relevant contexts and on which 
responsibility attributions depend. Libet et al. and the long-standing ex-
perimental tradition they created, operationalize free action as a cue-
less, reasonless action devoid of any deliberative process. We suggest 
a pragmatic approach to free action that centers on the concept of re-
sponsibility and interprets freedom of will as coming from the presence 
of reasons to act responsibly. In order to substantiate this suggestion, 
we start by observing how recent neuroscientific research tends to op-
erationalize the concept of free action. In particular, we comment the 
paper by Bode et al. (Bode, Bogler, & Haynes, 2013), who borrow the 
classic Libet-style operationalization of free action. The authors found 
such action to share significant neural mechanisms with what they call 
a perceptual guess. We observe how the empirical results offer two pos-
sible interpretations. One supports the classic Libetian rejection of free 
will, while the other one offers reasons to rather reject the classic Libe-
tian operationalization of free action. On the one hand, one could con-
clude, following many interpreters of Libet, that what we believe to be 
a free action, is nothing more than a reasonless, rationally uninformed 
action, hence not genuinely free. On the other hand, one could also ar-
gue that, since Bode et al. are operationalizing a concept of free action 
that shares so many features with a genuine guess, common neural sub-
strates are to be expected. In other words, what is empirically studied 
as a case of free action, may actually turn out to be an investigation of 
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guessing instead. We believe that this second interpretation represents 
a compelling reason to revise the concept of free action and its opera-
tionalization in experiments. To make this point more evident, we de-
sign a thought experiment that translates Bode et al.’s experimental 
conditions into a more ecological context, where freedom is meaning-
fully entangled with the concepts of reasons and responsibility. We aim 
to show how the commonly shared experimental approach to free ac-
tions is in fact counterintuitive and not of the greatest relevance for its 
philosophical interpretations, thus suggesting the need for a conceptual 
revision. Hence our suggestion to focus on the study of free action in 
contexts where reasons to act responsibly are more prominent. 
 
Brain reading and mental privacy 
Contemporary brain reading methods and technology promise 
to provide significant insight in human mental states and processes. To-
gether with important scientific advances, such technology could bring 
up numerous societally relevant implications. In particular, the private 
nature of mental states might be affected to a certain extent, generating 
ethical and legal concerns. Brain reading has recently captured the in-
terest of both popular (Roth, 2009; Sample, 2012; Wolpe, 2009) and 
scientific (Farah, Smith, Gawuga, Lindsell, & Foster, 2009; J.-D. 
Haynes, 2012; Shen, 2013) press, that have discussed it from different 
perspectives, generating hype and expectations in society. Orwellian 
scenarios, where brain reading technology could be misused by ill-in-
tentioned agents to invade our privacy against our will, have been de-
vised on numerous occasions (Shen, 2013). This possibility, however, 
depends in large part on the extent to which current brain reading tech-
nology can identify mental states and some of their most specific char-
acteristics, such as the exact content of beliefs and desires, or their com-
binatorial structure. In chapter 4 we argue that semantical and syntacti-
cal aspects of mental states currently represent a significant challenge 
for brain reading methods. Those methods need further development to 
12 | INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
be able to deal with those aspects to an extent that is required for an 
actual decoding of the content of mental states. Such limitations have 
consequences for the kind of societal implications that brain reading 
technologies generate, currently or in the near future. In particular, we 
consider the discussion about the relationship between brain reading 
and the 5th amendment to the United States constitution (Pardo & 
Patterson, 2013). The 5th amendment provides privilege against self-
incrimination in criminal cases. It has been questioned whether the kind 
of information extracted from a defendant through brain reading meth-
ods could be safeguarded by the 5th amendment (Pardo & Patterson, 
2013). We aim to show that, given the current limitations, the data pro-
vided by brain reading is unlikely to fall within the scope of the 5th 
amendment. However, should those limitations be overcome, brain 
reading will need to be subjected to the constitutional limits imposed 
by the 5th. 
Scientific and technological advances, such as those that might 
lead to overcome the challenges discussed in chapter 4, can take place 
fast and potentially find society unprepared. It would therefore be im-
portant to acquire a clear and accessible conceptual framework to real-
istically estimate the practical applicability of brain reading methods to 
different societally relevant contexts. The fifth and final chapter of this 
volume is dedicated to our proposal for an evaluative framework that is 
based on five criteria through which any method could be bench-
marked: accuracy, reliability, informativity, concealability and enforce-
ability. In order to be considered for adoption in most, if not in all, prac-
tical applications, brain reading methods must achieve certain perfor-
mance standards. This is not only in terms of data accuracy and relia-
bility, but also in terms of the relevance the obtainable data has for the 
question that is investigated, a criterion that we named informativity. 
Many potential, potentially concerning scenarios, in particular those 
where mental privacy and civil rights are at stake, will also need the 
brain reading process to be concealable from a subject’s awareness. 
Furthermore, the most concerning ones among those scenarios involve 
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the possibility to enforce the technology, and reliably read somebody’s 
brain against his or her will. The five factors we outline constitute use-
ful criteria through which to produce an estimate of whether, when and 
in what practical scenarios a certain brain reading method could be 
adopted and utilized. Different stakeholders might take advantage of 
these accessible criteria to evaluate the extent to which the possibilities 
that brain reading opens up in principle are realistic, and the timeframe 
before they eventually become so. In turn, this would result in better 
awareness among the community and more timely reaction to potential 
ensuing ethical, legal and societal issues. 
Through the discussion of these three topics, we hope we will 
raise awareness about some of the potential consequences of current 
neuroscience and neurotechnology for the human self-image. Both in a 
personal sense, where neurotechnology can alter our individual self-
perception, and in a societal, cultural sense, where neuroscientific ad-
vances have a significant impact on our ideas, values and beliefs. This 
is not only a potential problem, but also an opportunity. It is precisely 
where neuroscience and society collide that opportunities for deepened 
self-understanding present themselves. In order to keep this interaction 
constructive, however, we need science and society to engage in a con-
tinuing dialogue that meaningfully involves the largest possible number 
of stakeholders. Such dialogue must be grounded on continuous com-
munication, and a shared understanding of basic facts and values. That 
is what we believe would ultimately lead to the creation of a truly hu-
mane neuroscience. We hope this thesis presents a useful contribution 
towards reaching that goal. 
 
  
  
  
Chapter 1 
STIMULATING THE SELF 
THE INFLUENCE OF CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORKS ON REACTIONS TO DEEP BRAIN 
STIMULATION 
 
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, Volume 5, 2014 - Issue 4
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INTRODUCTION 
Neurotechnologies are largely discussed in the contemporary 
scientific literature. One of them in particular, Deep Brain Stimulation, 
is drawing the attention of several different specialists, from clinicians 
to philosophers. Due to its potentiality of application to many different 
pathological conditions, DBS is commonly considered one of the main 
next generation neurosurgical technologies. In fact, this technology 
seems to be able to treat a vast number of diseases, from neuromotor 
diseases, like Parkinson’s and Essential Tremor (DeLong & 
Wichmann, 2012; Groiss, Wojtecki, Südmeyer, & Schnitzler, 2009), to 
psychiatric disorders (Goodman & Alterman, 2012), like Major De-
pression (Anderson et al., 2012) and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(Roh, Chang, Chang, & Kim, 2012). Yet, along with its remarkable ef-
ficacy, which is currently being tested in application to many patholo-
gies, comes a certain number of complications. These complications 
involve not only the surgical operative and post-operative aspects 
(Doshi, 2011), but also the chance of some behavioral/psychological 
alterations (Clausen, 2011; Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Mackenzie, 
2011; Schermer, 2011; Witt et al., 2008). As the literature extensively 
reports, the vast majority of the side effects are usually addressable dur-
ing the post-operative follow-up by optimizing the stimulator’s param-
eters (Clausen, 2010; Goodman & Alterman, 2012). Nevertheless, in 
many cases, the psychological well-being of the treated subjects cannot 
be optimally preserved, and setting the stimulation parameters is limit-
edly effective. These cases are discussed among the community of spe-
cialists and often require addressing ethical and theoretical perspectives 
on DBS (Clausen, 2010; Schermer, 2009a). In particular, there seem to 
be several adverse psychological implications behind a relevant num-
ber of post-operative situations. As stated by Clausen (Clausen, 2010), 
psycho–social effects seem to have the largest impact (quantitatively 
speaking) among the many reported side effects. 
Whether these psycho-social effects have to be attributed to a 
reactive response to a new situation or whether they are caused by the 
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stimulation itself, or both, remains to be elucidated (Schüpbach et al., 
2006). However, similar reports, in the context of cardiac pacemaker 
implantation (Beery & Baas, 1996; Wingate, 1986), suggest that part of 
these effects (from here on referred to as maladaptations) might be 
plausibly attributed to a psychological reaction to the new situation. To 
the extent that this phenomenon can be classified as psychological, it 
might conceivably be affected by the endorsement of a certain concep-
tual framework influencing the patient’s self-interpretation. This paper 
takes up this possibility, and evaluates how various conceptual schemes 
might play a role in the ensuing (mal)adaptation to DBS treatment. It is 
valuable to investigate the relationship between different conceptual as-
sumptions and the onset of psycho-social maladaptations in clinical set-
tings. In particular, we hypothesize that the frequently reported mala-
daptations might be partially caused by a conceptual emphasis on a 
“braincentric” materialism, sometimes also referred to as ‘neuroessen-
tialism’ (Reiner, 2012; A. Roskies, 2002), promoted by the scientific 
explanation of the pathological situation and perhaps also by the spe-
cific way this explanation is delivered in a clinical context. It bears em-
phasis that our discussion of various perspectives on the mind-brain re-
lationship aims to analyze their potential relevance for the empirical 
issue of their effects on the patient’s psycho-social response to DBS. 
Hence, we are not evaluating the philosophical merits (e.g. consistency, 
explanatory power) of such perspectives. 
It has been shown (Bering, 2006; Johnson, 2008) that the vast 
majority of the population believes in some sort of dualistic ontology 
where mind and body (brain) are separated substances. We suggest that 
whereas a dualistic approach can be seen as conciliatory of a good ac-
ceptance of neurotechnological implantations, a braincentric material-
ism may be more likely to evoke discomforting ideas and consequent 
maladaptations to therapies. After all, while according to a strong dual-
ism the brain is not involved in the very nature of your mind and self, 
for a braincentric materialism the brain is all what you, as a person, are. 
So, in the former case one could feel comfortably guarded against brain 
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stimulations because the stimulations will not touch one’s ‘genuine 
self’. In the latter case one might feel exposed to a personal disruption, 
for a stimulator interferes with what is responsible for the entire per-
sonal dimension, the brain.  
We hypothesize that different scientifically sound accounts of 
the mind-brain relationship could be suggested by doctors/nurses to pa-
tients during their communication regarding DBS and its effects. For 
instance, accounts like embodied embedded cognition (Clark, 1997; 
van Dijk et al., 2008; Haselager et al. 2008) or the more extreme per-
spective of extended cognition (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) might offer 
an idea of the brain as a component among others (body and environ-
ment) involved in the constitution of the whole larger phenomenon of 
mind (Clark, 2008), personality and self (Shoda et al., 2002). Unbur-
dening the brain of its central and monopolizing role could contribute 
to mitigation of psychological maladaptations and improve the quality 
of the whole therapeutic approach. 
Since experimental literature about the interplay between con-
ceptual frameworks and psychological reactions to DBS, to the best of 
our knowledge, currently is lacking, we intend the present work as a 
first conceptual exploration of the issue, thereby making a case for fur-
ther empirical investigations. 
 
DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION AND ITS PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL IMPLICATIONS 
The functioning mechanism of DBS is conceptually straightfor-
ward. After a neuro-functional imaging assessment of the disease, a 
team of neurosurgeons will insert one or two leads, one on each hemi-
sphere, targeting the specific brain area that needs to be treated. Ac-
cording to the pathology, different deep neuroanatomical structures like 
the subthalamic nucleus (STN), the globus pallidus internus (GPi), or 
the nucleus accumbens (NAc) can be targeted. Afterwards, each lead 
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will be linked to an electrical pulses generator through an insulated ex-
tension wire. Then, the whole device will work as a cardiac pacemaker, 
delivering electrical pulses with a certain voltage, length and frequency 
[for an accessible description of the details see e.g. (Machado, 
Fernandez, & Deogaonkar, 2012)]. The effects of the stimulation are in 
many cases assessable in few seconds, allowing to intra-operatively 
check the correct progression of the surgical procedure. 
However, as stated by Schüpbach et al. (Schüpbach et al., 2006), 
in spite of the excellent motor outcome, it is clear that the operation 
can result in poor adjustment of the patient to his or her personal, 
family, and socio-professional life. Whether this is a purely reactive 
response to a new situation or whether it is caused by an effect of 
STN stimulation on behavior, or both, remains to be elucidated. 
[italics are ours] 
In addition to cognitive/behavioral problems and surgical com-
plications, psycho-social difficulties are reported during many post-op-
erative follow-ups. However, we do not know whether those conse-
quences are due to some alteration of the brain functionality caused by 
the stimulation, or whether -and to what extent- there is a relevant psy-
chological/cultural component in the phenomenon. In other words, are 
-at least some aspects of- those discomforts due to the neurological ef-
fects of the stimulation or to thoughts about being stimulated? We will 
hypothesize that the latter is a relevant part of the problem and the pre-
sent work has to be intended as an evaluation of possible ways to ad-
dress -and frame- that component. According to Clausen's review 
(Clausen, 2010), this kind of adverse effects can be branched into three 
sub-categories, related to: patient’s perception of themselves (66% of 
reports in literature), familial problems (50-71%) and professional life 
(0-41%) [see table 1]. 
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Table 1 - Side effects of DBS 
 
Cognitive, % 
Speech disturbances 10.8−33 
Memory impairment 1.1−20 
Dementia 6.1−24.5 
 
Behavioral, % 
Aggression 2 
Hypomania 4.2−10.2 
Increased libido/hypersexuality 0.8 
Apathy 1.3 
 
Psychiatric, % 
Depression 1.5−25 
Mania 2−18 
Suicide 0.5−2 
 
Psycho−social, % 
Patient’s perception of themselves 66 
Familial problems 50−71 
Professional life 0−43 
 
Credit: Clausen 2010 
 
We want to focus in particular on those patients experiencing an 
altered perception of themselves. As reported by Schüpbach et al., 6 
patients (20%) in their sample 
thought about the implanted material in terms of body image and 
formed a mental representation of the stimulator and the electrodes. 
Three of them, all women, had difficulty accepting the presence of 
an electronic device in their brains (“I feel like a robot”; “I feel like 
an electronic doll”). After struggling with the idea of being im-
planted with an electronic device, one patient finally coped well 
STIMULATING THE SELF | 21 
 
 
 
with it and made an artwork of her chest X-ray showing the stimu-
lator. 
Furthermore, 
Nineteen (66%) out of 29 patients expressed a feeling of strangeness 
and unfamiliarity with themselves after surgery (“I don’t feel like 
myself anymore”, “I haven’t found myself again after the opera-
tion”). 
DBS potential impact on identity, personality and self is well 
known in literature and it is currently attracting the attention of a rele-
vant part of neuroethics, [see e.g. (Baylis, 2013)]. As stated by Witt et 
al. (Witt et al., 2013b), 
The risk of becoming another person following surgery is alarming 
for patients, caregivers and clinicians alike. 
Yet this problem is not restricted to DBS. More generally, the 
relationship between a patient and a device can be problematic. As sug-
gested by Beery and Baas (Beery & Baas, 1996), this issue has been 
known for many years, since the first cardiac pacemaker implants have 
been performed. As the authors notice, there is a resemblance with the 
idea of cyborg, a futuristic man-machine hybrid, that is both fascinating 
and disturbing. It 
has been portrayed in television, film, and literature. This image of 
the cyborg is alien and often disconcerting; it is not of this world 
and/or is somehow extraordinary. 
People also have other associations with machines, which are not 
always positive. For example, machines wear out, and when they 
do, they are predisposed to dysfunction. When the analogy is made 
between person and machine, these images of the person-machine 
create the real-life equivalent of a mini-medical cyborg. Neverthe-
less, many people require modern medical devices to sustain their 
lives. 
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The analogy with what has already been experienced with car-
diac pacemakers is quite clear. As Wingate (Wingate, 1986) indicates, 
talking about those kind of implants, 
a pacemaker can be viewed as an artificial organ, but unlike an ar-
tificial limb, it controls a function in the patient rather than it being 
something the patient can control (p.93) 
A DBS might be easily associated to a traditional pacemaker, 
but in a certain sense it goes a step further. If its cardiac counterpart, as 
correctly pointed by Berry and Baas, intervenes on what is metaphori-
cally and physiologically considered “the spark of life” (Beery & Baas, 
1996), the deep brain stimulator directly touches the source of what is 
by many believed to be at the center of personhood, or, to quote 
(Churchland, 1996) “the seat of the soul”. Also, the comparison with 
cardiac pacemakers reports clearly suggests that the psychological 
component of those maladaptations is significant. In fact, cardiac pa-
tients’ reports are quite similar to those of the neurological ones, but 
while for the latter we can reasonably consider attributing those issues 
to the activity of the neural stimulator, for the former doing the same 
would be hardly feasible. 
Another issue concerns the argument that while the maladapta-
tion is of a psychological nature, it might at least partially be a reaction 
to the novelty of the treatment. It could be that, once (and if) this tech-
nology would be socially accepted, say after a few decades, maladap-
tation reports might tend to decrease in number, as may have happened 
in relation to cardiac pacemakers (we have been unable to find any pa-
pers on this). However, even if this were the case, we should consider 
two things. On one hand, the fact that maladaptations to DBS can be 
countenanced through a change in psychosocial perspective is exactly 
what we are suggesting. Moreover, one of the goals of this paper is to 
evaluate how such a process could be facilitated (see our suggestion 
below). On the other hand, the heart, unlike the brain, does not have 
(especially in western culture) a central role in the explanations of 
mind-brain relationship that are likely to be upheld by and/or delivered 
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to patients. Hence, the effect of DBS might be more robust to the influ-
ence of ‘simply getting used to’ the technology. It is exactly because of 
this tighter relationship between the DBS and the mind-brain concep-
tions that we argue that an accurate evaluation of the psychological con-
sequences of different beliefs is needed in order to deliver adequate in-
terventions, both by cultural and therapeutic means. We will say more 
on this subject in the last paragraph. 
 
TWO PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Before proceeding, we have to consider two issues. The first one 
(i) is about the way we will conceptualize the idea of self. The second 
(ii) regards the possibility for conceptual knowledge to influence psy-
chological issues in general. 
(i) Since we are dealing with patient reports, a systematic all-
encompassing analysis of the concept of self would be as hard as dys-
functional. As far as the problem we want to address is mostly instan-
tiated by vague psychological assessments and verbal reports, we prefer 
to remain as close as possible to the concept of self pretheoretically 
adopted by patients in their narratives. The concept of self appears to 
be mostly used to denote the object of a re-identification over time. Re-
ports like “I don’t feel myself anymore” could be read as the inability 
to recognize at the present time the same person you know from past 
memories. An interesting analysis has been given by Kraemer 
(Kraemer, 2013), who describes these reports in terms of “Felt Authen-
ticity and Felt Alienation”: 
In general, I regard authenticity and alienation as felt mental states, 
where authenticity is indicated by a person saying things such as ‘I 
feel like myself’, and alienation is indicated by statements such as 
‘I am not myself’ or ‘I am no longer myself’. On my interpretation, 
authenticity and alienation are opposites: a person who is authentic 
is not alienated, and vice versa. In other words: ‘alienation’ here 
means ‘inauthenticity’. 
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Given our focus on maladaptions to DBS, as outlined above, we 
will restrict our analysis of self to the issue of (in)authenticity.  
(ii) Since we are going to analyze possible relationships be-
tween certain conceptualizations and an experienced mental state, we 
have to discuss whether -and to what extent- conceptual knowledge can 
affect the perception of one’s own emotional states and behavior. There 
are several different examples in literature suggesting that this is likely 
to be possible. Vohs and Schooler (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) success-
fully manipulated the belief in determinism (as a theory of mind and 
free will) of a significant group of subject, altering their behavioral re-
sponse towards cheating in a game. That study showed with a certain 
degree of clarity how a theoretical explanation can induce behavioral 
modifications and alter moral perception. Another experimental study, 
conducted by Mangels et al. (Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good, & 
Dweck, 2006), showed how different theories of intelligence can 
deeply influence learning abilities in two sample groups of students. In 
the authors’ words: 
Those [students] who believe intelligence is a fixed entity (entity 
theorists) tend to emphasize ‘performance goals’, leaving them vul-
nerable to negative feedback and likely to disengage from challeng-
ing learning opportunities. In contrast, students who believe intelli-
gence is malleable (incremental theorists) tend to emphasize ‘learn-
ing goals’ and rebound better from occasional failures. 
We believe that relevant data have been collected in experi-
mental research that support the idea of a possible influence between 
conceptual knowledge and individual psychology. Nonetheless, we 
suggest that further experimental investigation is required to sharpen 
the analysis of the specific relationship between DBS’ psychological 
maladaptations and adopted theories of mind. 
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THE ATTRACTION OF DUALISM 
The theory according to which mind and body differ under sub-
stantial respects is called dualism. There can be several shades of dual-
isms, depending on what we consider being a substantial difference. 
However, in the most common account, the term dualism refers to a 
fundamental ontological distinction between thought and matter. The 
most important representative of this position is of course Descartes. 
Descartes' dualism distinguishes two different fundamental substances, 
called res cogitans and res extensa, which are assumed to be the con-
stituents respectively of mind and body. While the former has the at-
tribute of being thinking but immaterial, the latter has all the physical 
attributes we use to assign to any solid, three-dimensional thing, inca-
pable of any form of thought. 
While this perspective towards the mind body problem has been 
largely rejected by contemporary authors as well as by most of the pro-
fessionals in medical environment, it has always encountered the ap-
proval of the large public. As Johnson (Johnson, 2008) suggests, 
for at least the past three decades, scholars and researchers in many 
disciplines have piled up arguments and evidence for the embodi-
ment of mind and meaning. However, the implications of this re-
search have not entered the public consciousness, and so the denial 
of mind/body dualism is still a highly provocative claim that most 
people find objectionable and even threatening. 
Being also congenial to many religious views, Cartesian dual-
ism seems to be rooted in a vastly shared intuition which underlies a 
difficulty in conceiving mind as a physical phenomenon like any other. 
Mind/Body dualism is so deeply embedded in our philosophical and 
religious tradition, in our shared conceptual systems, and in our lan-
guage, that it can seem to be an inescapable fact about human na-
ture. One pervasive manifestation of this dualism in many of our 
ethical, political and religious practices, is the assumption that we 
possess a radically free will, which is assumed to exist apart from 
our body and to be capable of controlling them. […] Just asking the 
26 | STIMULATING THE SELF 
 
 
 
question "How are body and mind one, not two?" frames our whole 
conception of the relation dualistically, since it presupposes that two 
different things must somehow come together into one. [ibid.] 
This widespread mind/body dualism is popularly represented as 
a belief in the existence of some sort of disembodied entity that would 
eventually survive the body (i.e. an immortal soul). According to Ber-
ing (2006), 
by stating that psychological states survive death, one is commit-
ting to a radical form of mind/body dualism. Yet this radicalism 
is especially common. In the United States alone, 95% of the pop-
ulation reportedly believes in life after death (Greeley & Hout, 
1999; Lester, Aldridge, & Aspenberg, 2001). The majority of peo-
ple from other societies, as well, see death as a transitional event 
that unbuckles the ethereal self from its body. 
However, whether this dualistic tendency should be regarded as 
a cultural or a cognitive phenomenon, is controversial. Bloom (Bloom, 
2004) suggests that, rather than being just due to a cultural framework, 
the widespread tendency to endorse dualism can be attributed to the 
human capacity of recognizing intentionality. Being able to perceive 
intentionality is what makes humans able to engage in social behaviors, 
but at the same time it is a way to project into the world some sort of 
dichotomous distinction (i.e. systems with intentional states (agents) vs 
systems without such states (e.g. objects)). This dichotomy seems likely 
to be internalized more as an ontological one than as an epistemological 
one, giving birth to the dualistic idea of the existence of a “special sta-
tus” disembodied mind. The reason of the enormous popularity of this 
perspective among the large public, then, could be found beyond a mere 
cultural inheritance, rather being strongly entrenched in some cognitive 
mechanism. As the author suggests, dualism is not simply a belief we 
can theoretically reject, but more like something embedded in the way 
we perceive reality. In his book, he shows how we all seem to be bound 
to some sort of preconceptual dualism that makes us prone to under-
stand ourselves and the others projected into a dichotomous framework. 
On one side, there is the realm of thoughts and the personal sphere, 
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including our self and identity; on the other side, there is the silent mat-
ter of body, not much more than flesh and bones, where our material 
“ingredient” resides together with all the inanimate objects. This innate 
perspective, according to Bloom, seems to be due to the way our cog-
nitive system is originally structured: we are tuned to perceive mental 
states such as intentions, beliefs and desires that are characteristic of 
individual ‘selves’, and through these we structure our perception and 
categorization of the agents in the world. Mental states and selves are 
part of a conceptual scheme we apply to our interpretation of objects, 
agents and events because it is our natural and often successful way to 
understand and predict behavior, providing us with means to engage in 
mutual relationships and develop highly adaptive social dynamics. 
However, the idea of an untouchable soul might have implica-
tions for the evaluation (i.e. the interpretation of consequences) of brain 
interventions. With an inner self being safely sheltered in (or as) an 
immaterial substance, dualism seems to be an effective way to gain 
some distance from the unsettling idea of potentially becoming a human 
machine hybrid. There never will be an electrical discharge strong 
enough to disrupt one’s soul, and no surgery will ever change who one 
really is. However, such a dualistic stance will hardly survive the many 
different stimuli a neurological patient receives during her clinical jour-
ney. Moreover, the dualistic stance is unlikely to be sharply defined in 
collective imaginary, in fact, the general public’s perception of the 
mind/body relationship most likely consists of a large ‘grey area’, made 
out of inconsistent ontological assumptions and rich emotional biases. 
So, considering that hard-core dualism might exist only in philosophy 
classrooms, while the popular dualistic stance may rather be a pretheo-
retical, “weakened” one, what does that imply for the clinical context? 
In other words, is naïve dualism strong enough to resist the huge 
amount of evidence brought to a patient’s attention once she needs 
medical assistance? The following hypothesis seems reasonable to us: 
the fact itself of being aided in mind/brain related issues (such as move-
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ment or mood disorders) by an electrical stimulation might provide im-
petus for the concurrent rejection of the intuition of mind as a disem-
bodied entity. In addition, non dualist explanations about how mind and 
brain interact are given to patients by the many people taking part in 
the clinical journey, from nurses to doctors. In the accounts they de-
liver, the brain plays a central explanatory role, suffering from what has 
to be cured to get rid of the symptoms. Yet, the scientific explanation 
endorsed within that environment might have dysfunctional results, i.e. 
have negative consequences for the psychological impact on patients. 
We will further examine this claim in the next paragraph, where we will 
take a look at the neuroscientific account of the mind-brain relationship. 
 
BRAINCENTRIC NEUROSCIENCE 
The dualistic stance is not the only influential one among soci-
ety. Experts in clinical contexts and scientists in general are likely to 
endorse materialistic views, explaining the mind as a physical phenom-
enon among the others. The kind of monism adopted by neuroscience 
tends to materialize mind and self in the very matter of the brain tissue. 
Ultimately, this form of materialistic explanation tends to be markedly 
"braincentric", meaning that the mind and its functions are usually at-
tributed to the brain alone or even to single parts of it. Once the patient 
suffers from a neurological disease, she is likely to seek for medical 
assistance. For this reason, in an analysis of the conceptual influences 
on psychological reactions, we have to take into account what theory 
of mind is usually prevalent within the medical and cognitive neurosci-
ence milieu. We believe that the common neuroscientific perspective 
of the mind/body relationship is (or will tend towards) a form of mate-
rialistic monism which denies the existence of any kind of special men-
tal substance, accounting for mental properties as brain properties. 
Many contemporary scientists and  philosophers deny old-fashioned 
Cartesian dualism in favor of a modern materialism which makes the 
brain the fulcrum of every single cognitive property: paraphrasing Paul 
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Churchland, they make the brain the engine of reason and the seat of 
the soul (Churchland, 1996). This particular stance seems to be, at least 
in neurological clinical contexts involving DBS, psychologically more 
dysfunctional than the Cartesian one (N.B. our claim here is not that 
neurocentrism is untrue. We simply consider its potential implications 
for a patient’s (mal)adaptation). Making the brain solely responsible for 
any mental phenomena, including all the aspects involved in the pro-
duction of self, might come to be psychologically counterproductive for 
patients who have to undergo brain surgery and persisting functional 
alterations like the DBS ones. If what makes yourself who you are is 
only your brain, any intervention on it will touch upon and may funda-
mentally alter the essence of your personal dimension. A brain inter-
vention like the implantation of a stimulator becomes much more dis-
tressing from this perspective, for it can be perceived as touching your 
deepest psychological side, everything you consider being part of your-
self. Unlike when operating your knees, in which case you feel “safe 
up there”, when a DBS is operating within your brain, you’re not safe 
anymore, as the core of your self is being modified and corrected. In 
short, whereas the conceptual scheme of dualism provides a form of 
shelter from perceiving the potential self-modifying consequences of 
DBS, materialism enforces instead the perception of DBS’s potential 
disturbing effects on the self. 
However, as Bennett & Hacker point out in their Philosophical 
Foundations of Neuroscience (2003), prevalent expressions of neuro-
scientific materialism might be regarded as due to a conceptual fallacy. 
Materialism, per se, does not imply the idea of a fully responsible brain, 
which seems to be more a consequence of an overreaction to dualistic 
accounts. Inspired by Wittgenstein’s suggestions, they show how the 
fallacy of attributing every aspect of cognition to the brain alone fre-
quently occurs in neuroscientific literature. This conceptual fallacy is a 
mereological one. 
Mereology is the logic of part/whole relations. The neuroscientists’ 
mistake of ascribing to the constituent parts of an animal attributes 
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that logically apply only to the whole animal we shall call ‘the mer-
eological fallacy’ in neuroscience (ibid. 2003). 
This ascription, they write, especially when applied to psycho-
logical qualities, makes no sense. It is the animal being in its entirety 
which is the bearer of psychological states, and not just one of its parts, 
namely the brain. 
The brain neither sees, nor is it blind - just as sticks and stones are 
not awake, but they are not asleep either. The brain does not hear, 
but it is not deaf, any more than trees are deaf. The brain makes no 
decision, but neither is it indecisive. Only what can decide can be 
indecisive. So, too, the brain cannot be conscious; only the living 
creature whose brain it is can be conscious - or unconscious. The 
brain is not a logically appropriate subject for psychological pred-
icates. Only a human being and what behaves like one can intelli-
gibly and literally be said to see or be blind, hear or be deaf, ask 
question or refrain from asking. (Bennett & Hacker, 2003) 
 We can only attribute psychological states according to behav-
ioral observations, and neither the brain, nor any other part of the body, 
are generally good candidates for this attribution. From that point of 
view, it is hardly intelligible how the brain might for instance feel pain. 
Normally we observe someone behaving in a certain way, and conse-
quently ascribe the feeling of pain to the whole subject. As Bennett & 
Hacker say, 
Why, then, was this form of [fallacious] description, and the forms 
of explanation that are dependent upon it, adopted without argu-
ment or reflection? We suspect that the answer is: as a result of an 
unthinking adherence to a mutant form of Cartesianism. It was a 
characteristic feature of Cartesian dualism to ascribe psychological 
predicates to the mind, and only derivatively to the human being. 
[…] On the rebound from the Cartesianism and classical empiri-
cism, scientists and philosophers unthinkingly transposed psycho-
logical attributes from the mind to the brain. (ibid., italics are ours). 
Some authors have maintained that the apparent mereological 
fallacy is often just linguistic sloppiness, due to a certain common sense 
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use of the language rather than to a fallacious theoretical assumption. 
Although this is undoubtedly true in many cases, braincentrism in gen-
eral seems not to be merely a linguistic issue. Instead, it appears to be 
the intended expression of a theoretical account which pays scant atten-
tion to the importance of body and environment for cognition. 
Expressions of braincentrism may display a genuine fallacy, a 
mere linguistic convention, or a theoretical orientation away from 
acknowledgement of the importance of embodied interaction with an 
environment for cognition. Differences between those interpretations, 
although extremely significant for professionals and theoreticians, 
might have a relatively low impact on the general public, leaving be-
hind just the superficial impression that the brain is “all-that-matters”. 
We believe that what mostly counts within a doctor-patient relationship 
is the general idea that more or less seeps through during communica-
tion. Moreover, once the correlation between mental states and brain 
states has been made evident through the use of, and experience with 
DBS, it will be hard for an individual to turn back to a reassuring dual-
ism. That is, both the scientific context and the experience of using DBS 
are likely to provide a shift towards a materialistic perspective where 
body and mind are tightly entangled. Given that both positions provide 
unsatisfactory outcomes, searching for a new perspective, conceptually 
compatible with the implications of undergoing brain stimulation, yet 
psychologically providing ways to cope with the experience, is valua-
ble. 
 
EXPLORING THE THIRD WAY(S) 
We presented two different accounts of the mind body relation-
ship: dualism, generally accepted among the general public, and what 
we called materialistic braincentrism, accepted by a significant segment 
of neuroscientists. Being the most common explanatory frameworks, 
they are likely to have strong influence on patients who might poten-
tially benefit from DBS. We have suggested that these accounts, for 
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clinical purposes, might be impracticable (dualism) or potentially dis-
comforting (braincentric materialism). Hence, in the remainder we will 
investigate a theoretical account that can soften the friction between our 
-likely to be- concept of mind/self and the implications of neurotech-
nology mediated brain alteration. To achieve this, a good way might be 
to expand our concept of self, neither metaphysically relegating it to a 
soul, nor restrictively localizing it in the brain. Fortunately, several re-
cent theories are increasingly stressing the importance of a more holis-
tic approach to cognition. Especially relevant seems the theory of Em-
bodied Embedded Cognition (EEC), underlining the cognitive im-
portance of social interaction, as in Hutchins’ (Hutchins, 2001) distrib-
uted cognition, emphasizing the importance of bodily interaction with 
the environment (Haselager, Dijk, & Rooij, 2008; van Dijk et al., 2008) 
or highlighting the tight bound between cognition and context, as in 
situated cognition, ranging from Clark’s (Clark, 2003, 2008; Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998) extended cognition to the enactivism of Varela and 
Rosch (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993). All those approaches, nei-
ther metaphysically dualist nor braincentric, are acknowledging the im-
portance of the brain while relieving it at the same time from its cen-
trality. To exemplify what we mean, we will take into account two rel-
atively recent perspectives both implying an idea of cognition as in-
volving more than what is contained within the boundaries of the brain. 
These suggestions have to be taken as possible alternatives to the two 
accounts already presented. It has to be noticed that what is most inter-
esting for the purpose of this paper is the image of mind and self implied 
by these perspectives, rather than their effective explanatory power. 
Hence, these positions are interesting to the extent that they express a 
different idea of what mind/self could be or be dependent upon. 
The first suggestion we want to take into account comes from 
(Shoda et al., 2002). The authors persuasively suggest that a given in-
dividual's personality might be successfully modeled in terms of a dy-
namical system largely characterized by the interactions with the envi-
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ronment, and therefore with other individuals. Personal character, ra-
ther than being carved in the brain, would be conceptualized according 
to the situations in which the individual, as an open system, is immersed 
over time. This vision suggests that we can give an account of mental 
phenomena, including self, in an extended fashion, such that 
thoughts, affects, and behaviors that an individual typically experi-
ences are a function not of that individual’s personality system 
alone, but rather a function of the interpersonal system of which the 
individual is a part. (Shoda et al., 2002) 
An individual’s personality is modeled by the authors as a set of 
stable states of a dynamical neural network. Those states, called attrac-
tors, are known to be states in which the overall activity of an interac-
tive network (e.g. a neural network) settles after a certain amount of 
activity cycles. In a network, different states can be conceived as rep-
resenting different states of mind, responding to different stimulations. 
This way various aspects of an individual’s personality can be repre-
sented as dependent on the dynamical interaction of multiple factors, 
both internal and external ones. According to such an explanatory 
framework, then, the brain would not be the only component responsi-
ble for determining one’s personality. Rather, its role would be re-con-
ceptualized to make it one -but not the only one- of the elements in-
volved in determining individuals’ mental states. From this perspective, 
someone’s personality is not a product of the brain alone; rather, it 
emerges from a variety of interacting forces, influenced by factors both 
internal and external to the individual brain (and body as well). A sim-
ilar view has also been recently proposed by (Baylis, 2013). Although 
addressing personal identity, as different from personality, the author 
suggests a dynamical approach that resembles what is suggested by 
(Shoda et al., 2002). Baylis believes that once we assume a relational 
account of personal identity, i.e. as dynamically “constituted/con-
structed in and through personal (intimate) relationships and public 
(impersonal social and political) interactions” (ibid.), DBS is not to be 
considered threatening anymore. 
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A second illustrative account can be found in Andy Clark’s ex-
tended cognition approach, which suggests a slightly different but 
equally appealing perspective. Mental processes, far from being exclu-
sively a brain affair, might be implemented by different sorts and com-
binations of neural processes and external devices or artifacts. 
For what is special about human brains, and what best explains the 
distinctive features of human intelligence, is precisely their ability 
to enter into deep and complex relationships with nonbiological 
constructs, props, and aids ((Clark, 2003), p.5). 
Human intelligence, insufficiently supported by the brain’s lim-
ited capacities, would be embedded in the external world and so con-
strained -and supported as well- by the ecological -and technological- 
surrounding resources. Metaphorically described as scaffoldings, tech-
nological artifacts would be, in the Clark’s perspective, a constitutive 
part of our person. 
As our world become smarter and get to know us better and better, 
it becomes harder and harder to say where the world stops and the 
person begins. ((Clark, 2003) p. 7) 
Human minds and bodies are essentially open to episodes of deep 
and transformative restructuring in which new equipment (both 
physical and “mental”) can become quite literally incorporated into 
the thinking and acting systems we identify as our minds and bod-
ies. ((Clark, 2008) p. 30-31) 
On Clark’s account (that, to be sure, is strongly contested, see 
e.g. (Adams & Aizawa, 2001)), artifacts become part of our own cog-
nitive system, and consequently significantly shape all those traits char-
acterizing our identity. The view of cognition as naturally supported 
and even constituted by its own creations, by tools with cognitive prop-
erties, fits quite well with the possibilities provided by neurotechnol-
ogy. We are continuously aided by devices, and we constantly rely 
upon a number of different artifacts to be what we are. From stop-
watches to traffic lights, technology is integral part of our personal 
world: we already depend in different ways on technological means, 
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and in some sense we already are stimulated by any sort of personal 
digital assistants, from tablets to smartphones. Stimulating the brain by 
direct contact is reasonably more than that, but what this perspective 
suggests is that in between there is not a quantum leap, but a difference 
in degree. 
Again, it would be naïve to expect these philosophical positions 
to be embraced by patients or by the public opinion in general as they 
are. Realistically speaking, we should also accept that in between Car-
tesian dualism and monistic, braincentric materialism, there might be a 
“grey” zone with different combinations and degrees of ontological 
commitments, not necessarily entirely consistent. Hence, we are not 
suggesting that adopting these theories can change the way DBS is psy-
chologically accepted straight away. We understand that suggesting the 
need for practical solutions is easier that sketching them, let alone im-
plementing them in actual clinical practice.  At present, we can do little 
more than suggest that it is appropriate to distinguish at least two dif-
ferent levels of communication that are in need of further investigation. 
Throughout, of course, any shift in practice will take time and effort at 
different levels, and with several possible difficulties to overcome. 
At a personal level, a proper communication protocol could be 
developed in order to facilitate communication concerning mind/body 
relationship between doctors and patients. A specific perspective on the 
mind/body relationship such as EEC or extended cognition coupled 
with a dynamic view on personality and/or personal identity, when en-
dorsed by the clinicians, would tacitly seep through rather than being 
straightforwardly conveyed (i.e. implicit communication rather than 
outright teaching). Of course, directly discussing such topics might 
challenge e.g. religious beliefs and raise undesirable conflicts that 
might worsen the patients’ psychological status rather than improving 
it. Despite that, such communication might be valuable within a psy-
chotherapeutic context, both in pre- and post-operatory follow-up to ef-
fectively tweak the support strategy carried out by the responsible per-
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sonnel. Most likely, valuable lessons concerning this type of communi-
cation can be learned from cases where changes to patient’s world 
views and life styles (e.g. eating, drinking, smoking habits) are consid-
ered to be beneficial. In particular, important hints may come from the 
ever-growing field of palliative medicine [see e.g. (Doyle, Hanks, and 
Cherny 2005)] 
We believe that another, and perhaps even more important step, 
has to be taken at a societal and cultural level, where adopting and 
spreading a scientifically informed and encompassing (i.e. EEC) vision 
of the mind/body relationship might be crucial not just for the ac-
ceptance and appropriate interpretation of DBS therapy, but also for 
many more neurotechnologies increasingly used in clinical environ-
ment. The promotion of a non neurocentric, non-dualistic vision of 
mind and self through public media and in education would have sig-
nificant effects on the public perception. Studies (e.g. Dekker et al. 
2012) indicate how strong the influence of so-called neuromyths can be 
on teachers. Properly informing professional teachers will therefore be 
of great importance as well. Of course, this general idea has still to be 
evaluated and understood better from a variety of perspectives (patient, 
medical professionals, cognitive neuroscientists, philosophers, etc.) to 
estimate its promise to slowly replace other common -and in some con-
texts dysfunctional- perceptions of mind and brain. Of course, given 
that a theoretical standpoint is the only one currently accessible to our 
research enterprise, the previous considerations are not meant to be def-
inite but rather as providing some hints to evoke attention to these more 
practical aspects of dealing with patient’s maladaptations to neurotech-
nology. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we suggested that the adverse psychological im-
plications behind a relevant number of post-operative situations could 
at least partially be attributed to the influence of underlying views and 
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conceptual schemes concerning the relationship between mind and 
brain. We also hypothesized that adopting different conceptions about 
mind and self could improve the psychological adaptation to the thera-
peutic condition. 
We started briefly discussing the opportunity to consider DBS 
maladaptations as psychological reactions to a particularly demanding 
situation. We also maintained that the way we perceive mind and brain 
may be relevant in influencing the level of acceptance of DBS therapy. 
Consequently, we evaluated two of the most common ways mind-brain 
relation is conceptualized, and we observed that, for different reasons, 
they are suboptimal with respect to DBS. We suggested that a concep-
tual revision of the mind/body relationship, neither braincentric nor du-
alistic, but focusing on the embodied embedded nature of cognition, 
may help in reducing the psychological aspects of DBS maladaptations. 
However, unburdening the brain of its central role of "mind bearer" is 
probably just one of the possible ways for improving the personal, so-
cial and cultural acceptance of a device and to include it in a wider im-
age of the self that incorporates contextual and technological elements. 
Clearly, the evaluation of the role of general conceptual schemes in the 
occurrence or prevention of maladaptations in patients undergoing 
DBS, is just starting.
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INTRODUCTION 
Deep Brain Stimulation is one of the latest, most promising, and 
most widely discussed therapeutic neurotechnologies. Medically and 
scientifically speaking, it represents a fascinating leap forward into a 
yet unexplored territory, and thus offers much in terms of understand-
ing of brain functioning. DBS has been shown to be able to treat a vast 
number of pathologies, from neuromotor diseases, like Parkinson’s and 
Essential Tremor (DeLong & Wichmann, 2012; Groiss et al., 2009), to 
psychiatric disorders (Goodman & Alterman, 2012), like Major De-
pression (Anderson et al., 2012) and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(Roh et al., 2012). Yet, along with its remarkable efficacy comes a num-
ber of complications. These involve not only the surgical operative and 
post–operative aspects (Doshi, 2011), but also the chance of some be-
havioral/psychological alterations (Clausen, 2011; Klaming & 
Haselager, 2013; Mackenzie, 2011; Schermer, 2011; Witt et al., 2008). 
Although the majority of side effects can be, and effectively are, ad-
dressed in the post–operative follow–up by fine tuning the stimulatory 
parameters (Clausen, 2010; Goodman & Alterman, 2012), some others 
seem to be harder to remove by tweaking the stimulation. These cases, 
besides having been extensively discussed within the clinical/scientific 
literature, have drawn the attention of a number of neuroethicists [e.g. 
(Baylis, 2013; Clausen, 2010; Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Mecacci & 
Haselager, 2014; Schermer, 2009a)]. It is both conceptually and empir-
ically1 problematic to determine to what extent this maladaptation can 
be attributed to a psychological reaction to the new situation or to the 
effect of the electrical stimulation on neural mechanisms. Yet, at the 
very least it would be unwise to discard purely psychological causes a 
priori. 
                                                 
1 Conceptually problematic because psychological and neurological con-
cepts are theoretically entangled (Lavazza, 2014); empirically problematic for there 
is still insufficient data and knowledge regarding the causal mechanisms underlying 
the effects of Deep Brain Stimulation. 
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In a recent article (Mecacci & Haselager, 2014) we suggested 
the idea that, to the extent that this phenomenon is characterized by a 
psychological component, patients’ endorsement of certain conceptual 
frameworks might conceivably affect the degree of adaptation to the 
implanted stimulator. In this chapter, we will address several responses 
we were fortunate to receive. We will first briefly summarize the main 
argument of our (2014) paper. We started out by noting that effects of 
conceptual frameworks on adaptation to implants have been reported in 
the literature in connection to cardiac pacemakers, where there is no 
accountable neuronal stimulation going on (Beery & Baas, 1996; 
Wingate, 1986). We interpreted this as a potential suggestion that a psy-
chological component cannot in principle be ignored even in the case 
of deep brain stimulation. So, assumed that such component is relevant, 
our goal was to evaluate whether certain beliefs about mind and brain 
could influence, to what extent, and in which way, patient’s level of 
acceptance of brain stimulators. In particular, the problem we wanted 
to address was related to the frequently reported feelings of ‘self–es-
trangement’ and ‘alienation’ (Kraemer, 2013), according to which pa-
tients report “no longer being themselves” or even “feeling like robots 
or electronic dolls” (Schüpbach et al., 2006). This form of concern has 
been sometimes called in the literature “the cyborg fear”, and it roughly 
consists in the unsettling fear of being de–humanized by supportive and 
invasive technology (Schermer, 2009b, 2014). 
It is not unlikely (Bering, 2006; Johnson, 2008) that the vast 
majority of people believes in some sort of dualistic ontology where 
mind and body are separate substances. Whether this is due to a natural 
attitude (Bloom, 2004) or to cultural factors, many seem to adopt an 
intuitive, pretheoretical dualistic account of what is going on in their 
heads. We suggested that a dualistic perspective, regardless of its par-
ticular version, may be quite adaptive to the idea of having a specific 
brain area receiving small electrical impulses. The underlying rationale 
is that if one’s conception of ‘self’, of what a person is, relies on a du-
alistic metaphysics, coping with a brain intervention, including the 
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DBS implantation, might be easier. Conceiving mind and self as sub-
stantially separated from the brain might shield against the fear of be-
coming a tethered cyborg whose mental states are at the mercy of a 
battery powered pulse generator. 
In contrast, endorsing the opposite theoretical position, a kind 
of monistic ‘neuroessentialism’, seems to be less compatible with a 
good acceptance of the treatment. If one believes to be exclusively con-
stituted by brain activity, a brain intervention would likely to be con-
sidered as seriously affecting one’s mind and self. Through having the 
disease, experiencing the diagnosis, treatment, and brain stimulation, 
patients become acquainted with and may ultimately adopt this neuro-
centric perspective. Perhaps paradoxically, this more clinically and sci-
entifically informed perspective on mind-body relationship may aggra-
vate the psychological response to the knowledge of being stimulated. 
From a monistic viewpoint it is hard to avoid the realization that DBS 
affects the brain and thereby the self. 
After investigating the potential influence of different views on 
the mind-body relationship for the self-perception of patients receiving 
brain stimulation, we set out to find an alternative scientific mind-body 
perspective that might mitigate negative implications of DBS for one’s 
self-image. Our proposal consisted in developing a version of extended, 
embodied embedded account of mind. Without wanting to commit to 
any particular theory we just want to denote a theoretical perspective 
that, in accounting for the nature of mind and self, stresses the role of 
what’s beyond the brain, i.e. the body and its relation to the environ-
ment. Such account, although remaining materialistic and scientifically 
sound, might contribute to relieve some of the emphasis traditionally 
attributed to the role of the central nervous system as the sole responsi-
ble for the mental. In fact, being aware that our self is a construct to 
which many factors participate, from social relations to the environ-
ment itself, might relieve some of the psychological stress from the pa-
tients. A number of theories are available to flesh out our suggestion. 
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For instance, Shoda et al. proposed that a certain individual’s personal-
ity might be successfully modeled in terms of a dynamical system char-
acterized by the interactions with the environment, and therefore with 
other individuals (Shoda et al., 2002). According to such vision, one’s 
brain would not be the only component responsible for her personality. 
Rather, such framework re–conceptualizes the brain to be one, but not 
the only one, of the many aspects, both internal and external, that de-
termine a person’s character. Similarly, and perhaps more compel-
lingly, the widely known perspective offered by seminal theorists of 
embedded embodied cognition, e.g. Andy Clark, hint at the opportunity 
to reconsider the important role of both the body and the external world 
in defining one’s self. The cognitive aids we use daily, from pen and 
paper to stopwatches to traffic lights, are strictly entangled with the 
properly neuronal activity responsible for the production of mental 
states (Clark, 2003, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). 
We considered different ways to implement this suggestion. A 
short term one was identified in psychological counseling, aimed at re-
structuring some of the beliefs related to mind and self. We argued that 
a proper communication with a patient, performed by qualified person-
nel within a larger psychotherapeutic support program, could profit 
from our suggestion during both pre– and post– operatory counseling. 
Valuable lessons concerning how to implement this type of communi-
cation can be learned from cases where changes to patients’ worldviews 
and lifestyles (e.g., eating, drinking, smoking habits) are considered to 
be beneficial. In particular, important hints may come from the ever-
growing field of palliative medicine (Doyle, Hanks, & Cherny, 2005). 
A long term way of implementing our proposal that we consid-
ered consisted in promoting a slow perspectival change towards the 
adoption of an EEC stance within the clinical environment and more at 
large in the cultural perception of the mind body problem. The promo-
tion of a non–neurocentric, non–dualistic vision of mind and self 
through public media and in education would have significant effects 
on both the public perception of neurotechnologies and the theoretical 
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perspectives commonly endorsed, sometimes inadvertently, by medical 
personnel. We offered our analysis and suggestions as a tentative first 
step towards considering the possible connections between an individ-
ual’s response to recent neurotechnology and that person’s general 
views on the mind-body relationship. 
 
COMMENTARIES 
Our paper received an unusually high number of critical yet con-
structive commentaries. We use this chapter to clarify ourselves more, 
specifically by indicating that our claims were less far-ranging that 
some commentators may have taken them to be. Our starting point was 
that philosophers and scientists have been discussing the relationship 
between mind and body for centuries. The topic, if only at a cultural 
level, has an undeniably strong impact. We hypothesized that differ-
ences in perspective on the mind–body relation could make a difference 
in the psychological response to Deep Brain Stimulation treatment. If 
metaphysical perspectives are at all psychologically relevant, it is not 
implausible to expect them to be particularly important in the sensitive 
context of DBS therapy. Our goal was to generate a dialogue with an 
ideally twofold benefit: getting new insights on psychological implica-
tions of neurotechnology, and to shed some light on the importance of 
metaphysics for psychological well–being. We believe this kind of at-
titude to be coherent with the spirit of neuroethics that emphasizes and 
promotes the relationship between practical questions and philosophi-
cal reflection.  
We would like here to re–discuss our research in light of the 
many ideas that our paper provoked. We will not go through each indi-
vidual point of the commentators, but focus on the main lines of argu-
ment. A further section will then be dedicated to how our initial pro-
posal has to be modified. In our attempt to focus on the overall main 
points of the commentaries, we might not do justice to the details of a 
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particular point of an individual commentary. We will be happy to ad-
dress such specifics elsewhere. We will address the following main 
points in this chapter: 
1. Maladaptations, rather than being due to a shift from dualism to 
neuroessentialism, could be caused by beliefs being challenged 
in general or by a dysfunctional stance towards medical tech-
nologies (Schermer, 2014; Shepard & May, 2014), perhaps in 
connection to the recent history of psychosurgery (Moratti & 
Patterson, 2014), and/or in response to the influence of media 
on the patients’ perceptions of neurotechnologies (Ovadia, 
2014). 
2. The cardiac stimulator example we made in the paper consti-
tutes a counterargument to part of our own hypothesis 
(Schermer, 2014). 
3. The notion of ‘self’ referred to in the paper is not developed 
enough to understand the whole extent of the identity changes 
in DBS patients. Therefore, a more complex theory of self might 
be considered in addressing psychological maladaptations, e.g. 
drawing from Gallagher (Dings & de Bruin, 2014) or Bateson’s 
systems theory (Keyser & Nagel, 2014). 
4. Views on the relationship between mind and body when as 
clear-cut defined as dualism or neuroessentialism may be more 
resilient to change than we suppose in our paper (Lavazza, 
2014). Also, David Trafimow (Trafimow, 2014) indicated that 
we did not specify clearly how such a change could take place, 
and he suggested the use of self–priming methods. 
 
1. Regarding maladaptation, a few commentators, perhaps mis-
led by our insufficient clarity in the paper, objected that the maladapta-
tion we try to address is unlikely to be caused by a shift from dualism 
to neuroessentialism (Byram & Reiner, 2014; Mosley, Hall, Forlini, & 
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Carter, 2014) or by the mere assumption of a neuroessentialist perspec-
tive (de Haan, Rietveld, & Denys, 2014). However, we never actually 
meant to state any of that. Rather, our starting point was that it would 
be remarkable if one’s view on the mind-body relation would not have 
any effect whatsoever on one’s perception of receiving DBS. Hence, 
we suggested that it seemed not unreasonable to consider that dualist 
positions could make patients less, and neuroessentialist positions 
more, vulnerable to a number of concerns, amongst which the ‘cyborg–
fear’. The neuroessentialist shift should then be considered as poten-
tially strengthening factor or an enabling condition rather than a, let 
alone ‘the’, primary cause of maladaptation.  
Some authors suggested that such perspectival shift could be in 
itself enough reason for the maladaptation phenomena (Shepard & 
May, 2014). In an empirical investigation, conducted on healthy sub-
jects through an internet based polling platform, Shepard and May in-
dicated that those endorsing neurocentric positions seem to be more 
comfortable with a DBS procedure than those having dualist beliefs. 
From that they argued that a particular theoretical stance (usually dual-
istic by default) might not have much to do with the issue; instead, chal-
lenging dualist patients’ beliefs by neuroessentialism might itself play 
a decisive role. We take this to be a very interesting suggestion. How-
ever, since the data were collected from healthy subjects the conclusion 
need not apply to DBS patients. Moreover, if merely challenging beliefs 
could be taken to be responsible for psychological discomfort, one 
would expect to find such effects in a substantial number of situations, 
such as cognitive–behavioral therapy (that means to–at least partially–
challenge beliefs to improve patients’ conditions). Alternatively, one 
might consider the two factors as both adding to the patient’s discom-
fort, instead of only one of them being the only factor. 
A further alternative hypothesis to our proposal is that the mal-
adaptation to deep brain stimulation could be a consequence of the 
complicated history of invasive, innovative and still partially tentative 
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medical technology. Recent history of medicine, as Moratti and Patter-
son remind us (Moratti & Patterson, 2014), provides rather dramatic 
precedents that have not gone unnoticed by the general public 
(Diefenbach, 1999). Ovadia (2014) provides an admirable and much 
needed pointer to how media can influence the public perception of ap-
plications of neurotechnology, and the way stigma can be created or 
avoided. The cases of electroshock and icepick-psychosurgery, with the 
questionable ethics that accompanied them (Mashour, Walker, & 
Martuza, 2005; Wind & Anderson, 2008), are examples that are un-
likely to have fully escaped the collective awareness. Also, one of the 
peculiarities of those practices was the partial–sometimes almost total–
absence of any causal story underlying the success or failure of the in-
terventions. As pointed out by Pastore et al. (Pastore, Saracino, 
Innamorati, & Dellantonio, 2014), this characteristic lack of under-
standing is still partly observable in contemporary neurotechnology. 
Memories of the recent past could negatively affect patients’ at-
titudes towards techniques that are indeed much more sophisticated, but 
still yielding similar flavors, both for the associated idea of ‘drilling’ 
the skull, and for the fact that a general scheme to explain and predict 
the outcomes of such interventions is still only partially available. DBS 
is of course much more refined than ice–pick psychosurgery, and the 
knowledge we have of its mechanisms are much superior, but these dif-
ferences might be in some cases still too subtle or too unknown to be 
fully appreciated by non–specialists. Whether or not our suggested con-
ceptual shift could be helpful (Goering 2014) against the fear of becom-
ing someone else, a cyborg or a remote controlled person, it cannot do 
much to soothe the fear of bad medical practice, for which the only 
remedy we can think of is the production of public, encompassing and 
thoroughly discussed ethical guidelines. 
2. One of the arguments we took to support the idea that mala-
daptation could have a relevant psychological component, was that sim-
ilar issues were reported for cardiac pacemakers which, while having 
similar features (invasiveness, electrical stimulation, permanence), do 
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not have any direct impact on the brain. This observation, we suggested, 
supported the relevance of a psychological component of the maladap-
tation. However, Schermer (Schermer, 2014) points out that the very 
same argument could be used to claim that mind–body dualism cannot 
shield against psychological maladaptation. In fact, cardiac pacemaker 
patients reported feelings of self–estrangement similar to those who 
were implanted with DBS, but in their case there was no reason to be 
worried about brain or mind. In accordance to Shepard and May’s em-
pirical findings, Schermer hypothesizes that a general dualistic stance, 
rather than sheltering from fears, might actually be dysfunctional to pa-
tients’ psychological well–being. Dichotomies like natural–artificial 
and human–machine might be at the base of those preconceptions 
against external aids, and could substantially contribute to fuel the 
aforementioned cyborg–fear of patients. We appreciate this argument, 
although, strictly speaking it does not exclude the possibility that mal-
adaptation to different technologies could be sensitive to different ena-
bling conditions. For instance, whereas the cardiac pacemaker cases 
could have been related to, say, the novelty of the treatment alone (cfr. 
(Mecacci and Haselager 2014) p.32), the DBS case could display a 
markedly additional metaphysical component, i.e. regarding the mind–
mind body relationship. Hence, dualism could still contribute to dimin-
ishing the DBS related stress, while in the pacemaker case the benefits 
of a dualistic stance might outweigh the drawbacks. Still, we 
acknowledge the point of Schermer’s suggestion. Firstly, it helps to 
make sense of the maladaptations experienced in cardiac pacemakers’ 
cases by hypothesizing a common, potential cause. Secondly, it is co-
herent with Shepard and May’s findings (Shepard & May, 2014) we 
mentioned earlier, namely that a dualistic stance seemed to produce 
more negative reactions to the idea of invasive neurotechnologies. In 
any case, as Schermer herself suggests, whether the maladaptation is 
facilitated by a dualistic or by a neuroessentialist position, in order to 
soothe the discomfort of being invaded and controlled, a more encom-
passing, holistic view of mind and self might still be helpful. 
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3. Dings and de Bruin (Dings & de Bruin, 2014) argued that the 
concept of ‘self’ we framed in our paper was insufficiently developed 
to be able to fully flesh out the changes that DBS could bring upon it. 
In fact, we did not have the space to delve deeply into that matter, but 
it is indeed vital that this is done. We tacitly appealed to a psychological 
continuity criterion to establish a simple and pre–theoretical notion of 
self that we believed would be reasonably close to the account many 
patients could endorse. Dings and De Bruin (2014) suggest a pattern–
theory, inspired by Gallagher’s earlier work, that distinguishes a num-
ber of different aspects of the self. We welcome this proposal because 
it also provides for a framework that better fleshes out our EEC inspired 
solution. In fact, explicitly including “intersubjective”, “extended” and 
“situated” aspects of the self may help to make sense of the diversity of 
patients’ reports and provides a conceptual framework that may serve 
well to fine tune psychotherapeutic interventions. 
Another proposal regarding the conceptualization of the self 
comes from Keyser and Nagel, who suggest that the Batesonian 
(Bateson, 1972) system theory could be used in order to enrich both the 
understanding of the maladaptation and the way we address it. Accord-
ing to this theory, “characteristics of mind [e.g. self] are attributable to 
self–regulating loops where parts transform and transmit information. 
Segments of such loops can be, and in fact often are, located outside 
the organism. […] With this systemic understanding, a person is made 
up of numerous loops, ranging from the physiological to the societal 
level” (Keyser & Nagel, 2014). The suggestion is very important for it 
represents, together with the one offered by Ding and De Bruin, yet 
another possibility to better frame and operationalize the concept of self 
within our admittedly too general formulation of an extended, embed-
ded embodied account of mind. 
4. According to Lavazza (Lavazza, 2014), a straightforward, 
voluntary shift from more natural and gradually embraced perspectives, 
like dualism and neurocentrism, might be tricky. The author maintains 
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that these two worldviews correspond in a way to the Sellarsian dichot-
omy of the manifest and scientific images, respectively. These images 
are the result of a long-term cultural entrenchment that might hardly be 
challenged by simply talking it through. We agree that the effects of 
personally undergoing the clinical experiences involved in the illnesses 
for which DBS is currently used, as well as the procedures and conver-
sations required for informed consent, and the effects of the illness and 
of the eventual DBS, though profound, may in themselves not be suffi-
cient to overcome a deeply entrenched cultural perspective. We sug-
gested, therefore, to intervene both at the individual level, with focused 
interventions, and at the larger scale, e.g. by promoting a certain way 
of thinking and communication among the medical personnel and, on a 
larger scale still, among the general public. David Trafimow, among 
others, noted that the operationalization underlying our proposal was 
still too unclear. We agree that our suggestions are relatively novel and 
underspecified, and primarily invite suggestions for further research. 
Trafimow provides this, suggesting the use of priming methods as ef-
fective ways of shifting patients’ worldviews. Priming is a technique 
that is relatively easy to apply to make concepts more ‘accessible’ to 
conscious elaboration (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). In particu-
lar, as Trafimow suggests, one way to achieve our goal would be to 
prime what has been called the collective self, as opposed to the indi-
vidual one, in order to facilitate the emergence of a more extended con-
ception of one’s self. Although the details of this process need to be 
elucidated further within the present context, in particular to what ex-
tent such concept of self would actually relate to the ‘ecological’ one 
we suggested, we believe Trafimow’s suggestion to be in line with the 
explorative spirit of this whole discussion and we look forward to fur-
ther research to give an empirical validation to it. 
In all, we consider that much needs to be done (by us and, hope-
fully, others), in order to further clarify the role of perspectives on the 
mind-body relationship to the experience of and (mal)adaptation to 
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neurotechnology. It may be that our suggestions overestimate the im-
portance of such perspectives, or that we are wrong about the particu-
lars of the way a particular perspective affects the adaptation. That 
would not surprise us much. What would surprise us, however, is that 
mind-body relationship perspectives turn out to play no role whatsoever 
in an individual’s adaptation to DBS
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper claims that Libet-style experiments have relatively 
minor implications for the debate about freedom of will because of their 
particular operationalization of free action. In the first part, we argue 
that acting for reasons presents more genuine and important cases of 
free action than arbitrary or random actions. We then discuss a recent 
experiment, where a typical Libet-style operationalization of free action 
is utilized, to show that its results can be interpreted either as an argu-
ment against freedom of will or as revealing the relatively minor im-
portance of the adopted operationalization. We argue in favor of the 
latter interpretation by proposing a thought experiment that puts exper-
imental operationalization in an ecological perspective. 
Libet’s experimental paradigm (B Libet et al., 1982) is widely 
accepted and used in successful recent experiments (Fried et al., 2011; 
Soon et al., 2008). It focuses on the observed correlations between an 
action, the conscious awareness of intending, and the neural preparation 
for action. Both the empirical methodology of Libet’s experiment 
(Pockett & Purdy, 2010; Schlegel et al., 2013) and the theoretical basis 
of the study of neural correlates of voluntary action have been exten-
sively discussed (Nachev & Hacker, 2014; Nachev & Husain, 2010; A. 
L. Roskies, 2010a). This paper falls within the theoretical track, dis-
cussing the interpretation and operationalization of ‘free action’ in 
Libet–style experiments. Specifically, we question whether what Libet 
et al. called a “self-initiated voluntary act” should be taken as a proto-
typical free action. We believe that the concept of freedom that under-
lies such definition can mislead the philosophical debate about the con-
sequences of Libet–style experiments. 
We suggest a pragmatic approach to free action that centers on 
the concept of responsibility and interprets freedom of will as coming 
from the presence of reasons to act responsibly. Then we analyze a re-
cent neuroscientific experiment (Bode et al. 2013) that exemplifies the 
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traditional –and still in use– operationalization of free action. By trans-
lating the conditions of Bode et al.’s experiment to an ‘ecological’ con-
text, we aim to illustrate why this operationalization constitutes arbi-
trary or random action, and does not present the most important kind of 
free action to be studied for the debate about free will. 
 
ACTION DISTINCTIONS: FROM REACTIONS TO 
FREEDOM 
We agree with the recent literature (Passingham, Bengtsson, & 
Lau, 2010b; Schüür & Haggard, 2011) that actions can be distinguished 
according to their cues. A cue2 is the condition that prompts or triggers 
an action, and it can be either external (e.g. a flashing light) or internal 
(e.g. remembering something). Accordingly, an action might be cate-
gorized as either ‘externally–generated’ or ‘self–generated3. 
Self–generated action tends to be understood and defined in 
slightly different ways in the literature. In an experimental context, 
small differences in the definition can lead to significantly different op-
erationalizations. Schüür and Haggard (Schüür & Haggard, 2011) indi-
cate that first of all there can be self-generated actions that are  
not triggered by immediate external inputs but by identifiable and 
experimentally manipulated internal inputs (cues) such as memory 
traces, elapsed time intervals, previous actions, or (a change in) be-
havioral goals. (Schüür & Haggard, 2011) 
                                                 
2 Although the concept of “cue” is used often, its relationship with the con-
cept of “cause” and “reason” is not completely clear. To our understanding, in the 
current context “cue” has an epistemic connotation, a cue provides information that 
is used (e.g. taken as a reason) for potential action. 
3 It has to be noticed that conceptual issues have been raised about the scien-
tific validity of appealing to internal cues in general. An extensive review of the de-
bate would be beyond the scope of this paper. Those interested in deepening this topic 
may check (Nachev, 2010; Nachev & Husain, 2010; Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 
2010a; Passingham et al., 2010b). 
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These cues are well defined and can be manipulated by the ex-
perimenters (for an extensive list see (Passingham et al., 2010b) pg.18). 
Secondly, there are actions that are characterized by the absence of 
specification by inputs. This way of conceiving self–generated action 
is justified by the attempt to avoid the action being triggered or 
prompted by cues that are not attributable to the subject’s self, and fig-
ures prominently in the use of what is commonly called the free–selec-
tion task (Passingham & Lau, 2006), often used by Libet and others 
(e.g. (Soon et al., 2008), (Bode et al., 2013)). 
In free selection paradigms, all cues for action, both external and 
internal (here understood as conditions for action as specified by 
Passingham et al. 2010, p. 18) are removed. […] In free selection 
paradigms, these internal cues are not only not experimentally ma-
nipulated or controlled for, in fact, they are deliberately left out of 
the experimental design. […] The reasoning underlying free selec-
tion paradigms seems to be that if the degree of self-generatedness 
of an action is defined by the absence of specification by inputs, 
then free selection paradigms allow the study of self-generated ac-
tions in their ‘purest’ form. (Schüür & Haggard, 2011) 
Libet–style experiments indicate that the awareness of a deci-
sion to act is preceded by brain activity, such as a readiness potential. 
In such experiments the subjects are usually asked to lift a wrist or fin-
ger, letting “the urge to act appear on its own at any time without any 
pre-planning or concentration on when to act” (B Libet et al., 1982). 
‘Free action’ is designed to be as cue-less and unconstrained as possi-
ble. However, this is a problematic way of considering free action as 
Nachev (Nachev, 2010) notices: 
when one makes the choice “free” one does not make it uncondi-
tioned. Something has to determine the subject’s decision, by ask-
ing the subject to choose freely we are merely asking him not to 
give us an explicit criterion: in essence, to conceal (perhaps even 
from himself) the reason for his choice.  
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This is to say that actually freeing an action from any condition 
or influence may be hardly feasible. Even if all the cues were system-
atically ruled out, we might remain with hidden internal cues of which 
both experimenters and subjects are not aware. Indeed, the whole point 
of the experimental setup is to oust all potential factors that could pro-
vide reasons for, or influence in any way, the subject’s urge or intention 
to act, so that there is just no way to retrieve any temporally antecedent 
condition, at any level, that could be used in an explanation of the mech-
anisms of action. However, it is not clear to us why such a type of self-
generated action is considered to be so prominent for the debate about 
free will. In essence it presents deliberate refrain of experimental con-
trol (Nachev & Husain, 2010). Moreover, this free-action paradigm 
seems to contemplate a sui generis self that ultimately cues the action 
(Schüür & Haggard, 2011). Such a postulated entity comes close to 
possessing a metaphysical free will, prompting the action without being 
prompted. Its autonomous decisions are not depending on anything else 
than its own will. As Susan Wolf (Wolf, 1990) explains in her book, 
this 
idea of an autonomous agent appears to be the idea of a prime mover 
unmoved whose self can endlessly account for itself and for the be-
havior that it intentionally exhibits or allows. But this idea seems 
incoherent or, at any rate, logically impossible. 
We suggest that this type of free action, defined according to the 
absence of cues, does little justice to the common sense practice of 
holding people responsible for their freely willed actions that consists 
in asking explanations and justifications from the actor. It is remarkable 
that most empirical research has focused on experimental setups that 
make any answers to the ‘Why did you do it?’ question as impossible 
as possible. Why aim to set up conditions such that the only possible 
answer would be the sui generis explanation ‘because I felt like it’? Any 
follow-up question, such as ‘Why did you feel like it?’ would have to 
be answered by ‘I don’t know’. In the remainder, we will discuss this 
in more detail and suggest that a more relevant operationalization of 
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free action should not only admit, but actually require, the presence of 
cues. 
 
FREEDOM WORTH WANTING 
An alternative to setting up experimental conditions conducive 
to the investigation of completely cue-less, unconstrained, self-gener-
ated actions is the investigation of free action in the context of the at-
tribution of responsibility. From this ‘pragmatic’ perspective, cues 
make the attribution of responsibility possible by prompting action, e.g. 
by constituting or providing reasons for it. Of course some cues are 
more prototypical cases of being or providing a reason (e.g. an alarm 
signal) than others (e.g. an elapsed amount of time (Mita, Mushiake, 
Shima, Matsuzaka, & Tanji, 2009)). But in general this reason-respon-
sibility view contrasts with the current experimental Libet-style as-
sumption that the more absent cues are, the less reason for action there 
is, and the more free the action can be taken to be. It is not our aim here 
to provide a complete review of the different perspectives on the free 
will and responsibility relation, but we will give several quotes to pro-
vide some background4.  
Galen Strawson once stated: “are we free? It depends on what 
you mean by ‘free’” ((G. Strawson, 2010) p.1). One may search for a 
freedom of will in natural attitudes towards each other (P. Strawson, 
1963), in a certain interpretative perspective towards an agent (Dennett, 
1984), in a volitional quality of one’s real self (Frankfurt, 1988), or in 
the psychological ability to act upon (Wolf, 1990) or be sensitive to 
(Fischer & Ravizza, 2000) reasons. Many of these proposed solutions 
rely on a less demanding, metaphysical, definition of freedom, and in-
stead center on the action’s practical consequences and the criteria for 
the attribution of responsibility. As Strawson says: “What freedom 
                                                 
4 We do not wish to imply that the authors agree on all issues, rather to illus-
trate the various ways of emphasizing the relation between free will, free action and 
responsibility. 
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means here is nothing but the absence of certain conditions the presence 
of which would make moral condemnation or punishment inappropri-
ate” (P. Strawson, 1963). Freedom allows the attribution of responsi-
bility. For instance, according to Michael McKenna (McKenna, 2009), 
as a theory-neutral point of departure, free will can be defined as the 
unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in 
the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility. 
O’Connor adds that, 
most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very 
closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting 
with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical re-
quirement on being responsible for one's action. (O’Connor, 2013) 
Reasons, as noticed by Roskies, are an essential part of a widely 
shared concept of free action. Discussing the Libet paradigm, the author 
remarks that 
the first reason we should worry about the choice of finger or wrist 
movements as a paradigm case of free will is that when we think 
about freedom, what we care about is that we are free to act for 
reasons, and for those reasons we judge to be salient and compel-
ling. Freedom matters because it is thought to ground moral respon-
sibility, and the notion of holding someone morally responsible for 
an action that has no real consequence seems for the most part point-
less. However, when we generate actions spontaneously in the con-
text of such an experiment, we do not act for reasons at all, save the 
reason of complying with the experimenter's demands. (our italics) 
(A. L. Roskies, 2010b) 
Roskies’ criticism suggests that the free selection paradigm ig-
nores an important component of free action, i.e. the reasons that 
prompt and potentially justify them. All the freedom we might need to 
be responsible for our actions could be, to quote Susan Wolf, just “a 
freedom within the world, not a freedom from it” (Wolf, 1990). Society 
is ultimately structured on such kinds of reason-based freedom.  
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Fortunately, some experimentalists within cognitive neurosci-
ence are no stranger to this kind of approach. Some neuroscientists 
acknowledge that the existence of cues for action is not just compatible 
with, but also required for a proper understanding of free action. Bode 
et al., for instance, recently suggested that the empirical study of vol-
untary action should focus on the joint role of external and internal cues, 
instead of trying to get rid of them (Bode et al., 2014). We will examine 
one of his recent experiments on free action (Bode et al., 2013) in order 
to illustrate our plea for a more pragmatic experimental approach to free 
action. 
 
BODE ET AL.’S EXPERIMENT 
Bode et al.’s (Bode et al., 2013) experimental paradigm opera-
tionalizes free action in a way that is consistent with the Libetian tradi-
tion (i.e. as a cue-less self-generated action). It consists of three tasks: 
all of them are about categorizing two different classes of objects under 
varying conditions. The first task is called “categorization under high 
visibility condition”. The subject has to indicate whether a clearly rec-
ognizable presented picture represents a piano or a chair. The second 
task is called “perceptual decision under low visibility”. It is the same 
task as the first one, but with scrambled and unrecognizable images. 
Actually, this condition is a zero information condition, as no infor-
mation is present in the images shown, hence the subject has no other 
option than, in Bode’s terminology, a ‘perceptual guess’. However, 
thanks to masking stimuli presented both before and after the image 
itself and a manipulation of the timings, the subjects report just having 
difficulties in perceiving the picture, but that they do perceive it. The 
third categorization task is almost identical to the second one. This 
time, the subjects are instructed to ignore the visual stimuli presented, 
which again consist of scrambled pictures. They have to make a free 
decision and “freely express the first category that comes into their 
mind” among chairs and pianos. 
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What the authors found while analyzing the scanner’s data 
“points toward a common mechanism for internal decisions when ex-
ternal input cannot be used to resolve a decision conflict” (Bode et al., 
2013). In a nutshell, they found that zero information decisions (task 2) 
and “free decisions” (task 3) share (at least some) neural substrates. 
This would allow to cross-predict the outcome of both tasks, i.e. one 
can tell what the outcome of the latter will be just by monitoring the 
very same brain areas involved in processing the former. Both condi-
tions, as the experiment characterizes them, present cases of “Buridan’s 
donkey” (Bode et al., 2013); conditions in which there is no rational 
way to decide between two options.  
Two different philosophical interpretations of these findings can 
be given. From the Libetian perspective one could focus on the impli-
cations of the existence of common brain processes prior to action in 
task 2 and 3, which may lead one to conclude negatively about the ex-
istence of freedom of will. From our perspective, the issue is rather that 
the Libetian tradition is inappropriately focusing on arbitrary actions as 
the paradigm case of a free action. Here is how the argument goes. 
Given the presence of common neural mechanisms between what is as-
sumed to be arbitrary (what Bode refers to as ‘perceptual guesses’) in 
task 2, and a free choice in task 3, one may argue that what is happening 
in task 3 is actually akin to perhaps not the most important case of free 
action, namely an arbitrary action. Put differently, the experimental re-
sults could suggest that the kind of action that was taken to present a 
case of free will has little to do with (the possibility of) taking respon-
sibility. In cases where there is no information to base one’s decision to 
act on, it makes no sense to speak of a responsible action. The decisions 
made in the second and the third task share the same lack of infor-
mation, they only differ in the subjects’ awareness of not having that 
information. 
To be sure, we are not saying that actions performed under par-
tial uncertainty conditions have to be taken as random. Many reasona-
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bly defendable decisions are performed under a certain degree of un-
certainty. Rather, we are suggesting that the label ‘free action’ may not 
be meaningfully applied to situations in which a person is absolutely 
c(l)ueless. This is not a problem with the authors’ empirical research; 
moreover, they are in line with a commonly shared definition of free 
action, based on the Libetian tradition. Rather, our claim is that this 
tradition may be misleading regarding free action, especially regarding 
its relevance for the philosophical debate on free will. Also, we point 
out that this empirical research can be valuably taken as showing how 
free action, as classically conceptualized, is closely entangled–both 
neurologically and conceptually–with that of an arbitrary action. 
In the next section, we will offer a reinterpretation of Bode et 
al.’s experimental conditions in an ecological context, aiming to show 
how the commonly shared experimental approach to free actions is in 
fact counterintuitive and not of the greatest relevance for its philosoph-
ical interpretations. We will also show how Bode et al.’s empirical re-
sults, once translated into an ecological scenario, suggest the need of a 
terminological revision. 
 
A PRAGMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR FREE ACTION 
We suggest to challenge the importance granted to the type of 
free action is examined in experiments such as those of Libet and Bode 
et al. Specifically, we propose to consider an action important to the 
debate about free will first and foremost when it is undertaken in the 
presence of identifiable cues. The requirements for an action to be par-
adigmatically free might include pragmatic criteria involving reasons, 
responsibility and practical consequences.  
To substantiate our suggestions, we will show that the tradi-
tional free selection paradigms’ definition and operationalization of 
free action appears slightly counterintuitive when as-accurately-as-pos-
sible translated into a practical scenario. In fact, one of the reasons why 
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free decisions are operationalized in the way that Libet and followers 
do, is because the experimental context is in a number of ways different 
from the real world. The action produced by the participant in the ex-
periment is performed without any actual reason, neither internal nor 
external, except for the general one to comply with the experimenter’s 
request, and regardless of the consequences (for there are none within 
the experiment). To be able to appreciate the possible differences be-
tween these two settings (the real and the experimental one), we made 
up a set of scenarios that ‘ecologically’ reproduce the conditions of 
Bode’s experimental context we examined. Given our assumption that 
moral responsibility is important to the notion of free action, we tried 
to stress it in our stories, which reproduce Bode’s experimental condi-
tions in an environment that presents additional elements such as rea-
sons and consequences.  
In our version of the task the experimental subject will be a nu-
clear technician. Furthermore, our subject does not need to simply clas-
sify an image, but needs to use the image to determine a certain step of 
a reaction process in a power plant. We assume that the difference be-
tween this task and a pure classification one is irrelevant to our point, 
as the decisional nature of the action based on the presented information 
is preserved. The monitor in front of our technician flashes due to a 
malfunctioning caused by an emergency situation, providing both 
masking stimuli and scrambled images, hence creating the same condi-
tions of as of Bode’s paradigm. The technician has to decide, according 
to the information displayed on the screen, whether to push a red or a 
green button. If the incorrect button is pressed, there will be a core melt-
down. For the argument’s sake, we will ignore the emotional compo-
nent of this particular situation. Following are three stories, where each 
story corresponds to one task of Bode’s experiment that was analyzed 
in the previous paragraph. Further below, we will comment and discuss 
them. 
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(a) Bode’s externally cued decision under high visibility: the infor-
mation is available and the technician is correctly aware of it.  
Although the control panel screen was almost gone, it was 
showing reasonably reliable information. Trying not to panic, 
the technician shut down the core and saved the city. Next day 
there were celebrations, and she was honored for taking a good 
decision that day at the power plant. Her colleagues and fellow 
citizens were proud of her, for she was responsible for saving 
their lives. 
 
(b) Bode’s unintentional internal decision, a.k.a. perceptual guess: 
no external information is available, but the technician still be-
lieves that an informed decision can be made.  
The technician looked at the screen and the image appeared to 
be distorted. Nevertheless, she seriously believed that what she 
could see was informative enough to make a responsible choice 
and push the right button with a degree of confidence. Unfortu-
nately, the core melted down and an environmental disaster 
could not be avoided. However, she was able to survive, and 
blamed herself for her wrong decision. Unexpectedly, a few 
months later, beneath the debris of the plant, someone retrieved 
a black-box, which showed that the information to be shown in 
the screen that fateful day was not available: the screen actually 
presented nothing useful to make the technician’s decision eas-
ier. The mayor called her immediately and held a press confer-
ence to tell everyone that, although unaware of it, she was not 
in condition to decide, hence not responsible for what she did. 
Although she took herself to have reasons for her decision (and 
hence had them in a sense) these ‘reasons’ were not based on 
relevant information. Despite her conviction, she actually was 
cue-less and her decision arbitrary.  
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(c) Libet and Bode’s intentional internal decision, a.k.a. free deci-
sion: the technician has no external cues to base her decision 
on and does not believe to have any.  
The screen was broken, the technician thought there were no 
options left but to push the button randomly, eventually saving 
the situation despite the fifty-fifty chance of success. It could 
have just been her lucky day, because she hit the right button, 
shutting down the core and saving many lives. However, she 
decided not to tell anybody about what happened, taking the 
honors without revealing the real fact that she was just lucky. 
As lies can get you nowhere, days after the fact, a colleague of 
hers checked the closed-circuit camera recordings containing 
clips about the day of the crisis. There she found that nothing 
actually showed up on the screen and that her supposedly heroic 
colleague had no elements to ground her decision on, yet she 
undeservedly took credit for what had happened. A press release 
revealed the fact and many blamed the boastful technician who 
claimed to be the responsible for that decision. 
 
Our thought experiment is not designed to be a proof of any-
thing. Rather, it is an intuition pump (Dennett, 2013), and its function 
is to show how concepts like guesses and free decisions are used in 
everyday ethical practice. We introduced some elements in order to en-
rich Bode et al.’s experimental setting and make it ecologically valid. 
First, the scenarios present good reasons (cues) to act in a certain way, 
and our subject was or was not aware of them. Second, decisions lead 
to moral consequences for the subject. Third, there is a strong accent 
on responsibility, and its attribution is based on reasons why our subject 
acted in the way she did. By changing the criteria for free action in this 
way, we make room for more freedom outside the narrow space of cue-
less internal actions. Furthermore, it allows interpreting Bode’s under-
determined internal decisions of task three as an arbitrary kind of ac-
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tion. As we can see, in these stories the sharp conceptual divisions char-
acteristic of Bode’s experimental context tend to fade away. For in-
stance, let us examine the first case, in which our subject has all the 
information she needs to make a decision. She has reasons and clear 
cues to act the way she does. Is that decision free? On one hand, that 
decision is indeed free, for the subject is free to refrain from acting and 
might choose to avoid pushing any button, turn her back and run away. 
On the other hand, she is constrained by compelling reasons like the 
status of the external world (she might die together with many others) 
and the nature of her task, which is to shut down the core in order to 
avoid grave consequences. To achieve her goal, she is not free to decide 
which button to push or whether to push it. Yet, what really seems to 
make that action a free decision is not her being free or being free from 
constraints (cues, reasons…), but the fact that she correctly followed 
the available information. She made herself both responsible for what 
she did and willing to take the burden of her choice. Of course, despite 
the presence of external information constraining her potential range of 
choices, she could have made mistakes or have chosen differently, per-
haps due to a wild dream of exterminating a population. Yet there were 
good reasons to choose one option over the other, and she can justify 
her choice adducing those evidences: this is exactly why this kind of 
decision entails freedom and responsibility as they seem to be com-
monly conceived. 
The second scenario presents a subject that believes to be aware 
of the external world, but who is actually cue-less. Is she responsible 
for her decision? We could argue, as before, that she is free to refrain 
from pushing the button at all, but given her task, she has compelling 
reasons to push it and at least believes to have the means to make a 
rational decision. Even though believing to have reasons provides one 
with reasons, those reasons would not be the ones relevant to the attrib-
ution of responsibility5. In a way, one could compare this situation to a 
                                                 
5 There is one potential confusion we would like to forestall here. One could 
still meaningfully attribute responsibility in this case in the following way: If one 
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visually stimulated hallucination of the technician. Unaware of it being 
a hallucination, she responds to what she thinks were cues. Yet if there 
were no cues she could act upon, there was nothing she could do but 
guess, or, in our terminology, there was nothing left for her to do but 
acting arbitrarily. Having to act arbitrarily exempts one from the re-
sponsibility that normally accompanies decisions. 
The third scenario is the one where the dissonance between ex-
perimental context and reality seems to be more tangible. Here our sub-
ject is aware that she has no reason to ground her choice and, given that 
there is no information available and it is worth giving a try, she decides 
to take a guess and randomly presses one of the two buttons. Again, we 
would say that she was free in choosing whether or not to push any 
button, and although she could have gone home, there were good and 
justifiable reasons (surviving is one of those) why she decided to inter-
vene.6 Differently, when we come to the decision of which button to 
press, we may find it challenging to claim that this was a free decision 
in a relevant sense, for the action itself has very little to do with the 
subject’s responsibility and her ability to decide. She guessed, because 
in order to be able to make a responsible decision she would have 
needed information that was completely absent. Arguably, her decision 
could have been made by tossing a coin.  
In all, we believe that the reinterpretation that we suggested 
above portrays actions in a way that better reflects the customary con-
nection between free action and the attribution of responsibility. More-
                                                 
believes that X and therefore one does Y, that could be wrong (blameworthy) in the 
sense that never in the case of X one should do Y, regardless of whether or not X is 
actually the case. This, however, is a type of responsibility (what would you do if X 
applies) that we are not discussing here. We are addressing responsibility for action, 
not for hypothetical action. 
6 In Bode’s experiment, this freedom is represented by subjects’ liberty not 
to comply with experimenters’ requests. 
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over, it may contribute to a change in the way free action is operation-
alized within experimental contexts, potentially leading to novel find-
ings and/or interpretations of data.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we tried to show how different conceptual as-
sumptions about freedom can lead to different interpretations of empir-
ical data. The conceptual vocabulary underlying Libet’s experiment, 
and regularly adopted by others does not seem to fit well with the notion 
of freedom as commonly endorsed in daily practice. We illustrated this 
by a thought experiment translating a scientific experiment to a real life 
context, indicating how a certain experimental paradigm loses part of 
its appeal when it is translated into an ecological equivalent. Specifi-
cally, we hope to have indicated how the alternative view discussed in 
this paper may be relevant for the design as well as the interpretation of 
empirical research about free will and free action. Of course, the exam-
ples presented here do not hold the strength of a logical argument. We 
are aware that there is still no full agreement in sight concerning the 
nature of free will, what its paradigmatic cases are, its relation to the 
attribution of freedom and responsibility, or even what free action and 
responsibility ultimately mean. Yet, since those concepts do not belong 
to the scientific domain any more than they do to the political and so-
cietal one, debating them is a concern of both the experimental sciences 
and humanities. 
  
Chapter 4 
IS BRAIN READING MIND READING? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience have made it possi-
ble to decode or interpret mental states of human beings by measuring 
brain activity. This is often referred to as ‘brain reading’: using brain 
measurements for mind reading. The concept of ‘brain reading’ is often 
used, but complex. In this paper, we will examine aspects of its mean-
ing, and at least some of the issues that need to be addressed in order to 
assess any claim that brain reading has been achieved. We will attempt 
to do so by discussing the concepts of brain reading, mind reading, and 
reading. We will indicate some consequences of our analysis by ad-
dressing its implications for the 5th amendment to the United States 
Constitution. We will argue that, in its current stage, brain reading 
should not yet be considered to instantiate a case of mind reading in the 
sense of decoding or interpreting the combinatorial syntax and seman-
tics of mental states. Following Pardo & Patterson’s (2013) analysis of 
the 5th amendment, we suggest that, for this very reason, the 5th amend-
ment does not apply to brain reading yet, but may do so when the chal-
lenges of syntax and semantics have been met. 
 
WHAT IS MEANT BY READING THE BRAIN? 
In the Syracuse Herald of 1919, a drawing of a ‘thought re-
corder’ was published (“This Machine Records all your Thoughts,” 
1919) and the accompanying text says: “The thought recorder is an in-
strument recording thoughts directly by electrical means, on a moving 
paper tape.” Shown is a headband not unlike the currently commer-
cially available dry electrode wearable EEG headband of e.g. Emotiv 
(www.emotiv.com). Then, in theory, as now, in practice, the aim is 
clear: measuring aspects of neuronal activity in order to access the con-
tent and type of mental states and processes7. Various techniques exist 
                                                 
7 The difference between content and type of a mental state can be illustrated 
as follows: one can hope or fear that ‘the man with the white hair wins the election’. 
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for the measurement of brain processes. Functional Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging (fMRI) measures blood flow via the magnetic properties 
of hemoglobin that carries oxygen to brain areas that have been acti-
vated in order to restore energy. Electroencephalography (EEG) 
measures the collective spikes of billions of neurons. Single cell record-
ings measure the activity (discharges) of individual cells. Each tech-
nique has its own advantages and disadvantages, but all of them involve 
technologies directed at measuring specific features of the brain. What 
makes brain measurements candidates for being labeled ‘brain reading’ 
is that the measurements are taken in order to ‘read someone’s mind’. 
Alternatively, as happens in Brain-Computer Interfacing, one could use 
brain measurements to drive an application (e.g. a cursor on a computer 
screen) (Van Gerven et al., 2009), but here the brain measurements are 
used (as a steering signal) but not decoded or interpreted regarding their 
mental meaning. 
 
WHAT IS MEANT BY READING THE MIND? 
Mind reading in itself is nothing new. For as long as there has 
been social interaction, the agents involved have been trying to ‘mind 
read’: to guess or infer the intentions, beliefs, desires, feelings or ca-
pacities of others. More specifically, one may think of the following 
examples of some traditional psychological categories: beliefs (I think 
that unicorns exist), desires (I want a glass of beer), knowledge: (a tri-
angle is a polygon with three edges and three vertices), intention (I’ll 
climb that mountain), occurrent thought (did I see this before?), dispo-
sitions (character traits, personality features: Mary is a social, extrovert, 
hot-tempered person), qualia (seeing red, tasting wine, feeling happy), 
                                                 
Such mental states would have the same content, but express a different attitude to-
wards it. Of course someone could also hope that ‘the man with the red hair wins the 
election’. Here the attitude is the same (hope), but the content different.  
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etc. For the purpose of this chapter we will focus on beliefs and desires 
involving propositional attitudes (J. A. Fodor, 1978). 
By observing the behavior of others (which may, but need not 
include linguistic utterances) we can attribute a wide variety of mental 
states and processes to them. For instance, on the basis of seeing brisk, 
sudden movements of an individual, accompanied by loudly voiced ob-
scene language, we may infer that the person is angry, and, from further 
context information (e.g. frantically searching his pockets) that the per-
son believes he lost something (or has been robbed). 
What brain reading adds to the traditional interpretation of the 
behavior of others is a different mode of observation. That is, another 
way of inferring the content and nature of mental states has become 
available, i.e. by observation (measurement) of brain activity. Through 
this new method, it may become possible to see new or more refined 
distinctions between mental states and processes, but this need not nec-
essarily be the case. Also, brain reading opens up the opportunity to 
collect information about mental states -that may or may not be actively 
concealed from external view- without recurring to directly observable 
behavior8. Together with novel possibilities, however, this additional 
mode of observation (measuring brain activity) may bring about new 
and/or profound consequences, for instance regarding privacy and law. 
 
WHAT IS MEANT BY READING? 
Reading is a rather complex process of constructing meaning 
from a written text. It consists of various subskills (e.g. discriminating 
letters, recognizing words), requires practice and more interpretations 
than one are possible, depending on context. More extensively it can be 
                                                 
8 To a minor extent, this was already possible with classic investigation meth-
ods like the polygraph, which aims at picking up physiological signs. More infor-
mation on the relationship between different mind reading technologies can be found 
in [Mecacci & Haselager, submitted]. 
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described as the decoding of encoded information, by recognizing and 
categorizing representations (usually words or word combinations), ex-
tracting their meaning (sense and reference), and parsing syntax (based 
on word order) in order to grasp the grammatical structure. In relation 
to representation, it is customary (e.g. Cummins 1989; Dretske 1988; 
Uithol et al. 2011) to make a distinction between the physical aspects 
of it (the ‘vehicle’, e.g. specific spiking frequencies, or de-oxygenated 
blood flow in the brain) and the meaning that the vehicle carries (its 
content). Additional aspects of a representation are the user (the reader) 
and the objects or events that the content may refer to or be about. 
Within cognitive neuroscience, brain reading comes down to 
measuring various features of brain activity (classifying or identifying 
the vehicles) and correlating them to cognitive processes or states or 
dispositions. This goes via a sequence of stages. First, brain activity is 
measured and recorded while a person engages in a specific cognitive 
task, e.g. entertains a particular thought. Secondly, algorithms learn 
which brain processes correlate with these cognitive tasks, so they are 
trained to learn a particular mapping between cognition and brain ac-
tivity. In a third step (the ‘test phase’) these trained algorithms are ap-
plied to new brain measurements of persons, and then infer (‘predict’) 
which cognitive processes these persons are most likely to be engaged 
in. Once the correlation has been established, one can, at least in prin-
ciple, infer with a certain degree of certainty from observed brain ac-
tivity that a cognitive state or process has taken, is taking or will take 
place. Brain reading has been applied with varying degrees of success 
to reading an individual’s intentions (Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 
2013), the willing of voluntary actions (Filevich et al., 2013; Soon et 
al., 2008), the content of visual perceptions (Kay, Naselaris, Prenger, 
& Gallant, 2008; Schoenmakers, Barth, Heskes, & van Gerven, 2013; 
Stansbury, Naselaris, & Gallant, 2013), memories (Peth et al., 2015), 
thoughts (Huth, Heer, Griffiths, Theunissen, & Jack, 2016), dreams 
(Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, & Kamitani, 2013) and emotions (Huis 
in ‘t Veld & de Gelder, 2015), the nature of political preferences 
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(Lamme, 2010), sexual orientation (Poeppl et al., 2015), and the levels 
of pain (Cowen, Stasiowska, Laycock, & Bantel, 2015), experienced 
pleasantness of wine tasting (Plassmann, O’Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 
2008), and consciousness (Blume, del Giudice, Wislowska, Lechinger, 
& Schabus, 2015). In the ‘Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics’ one of the 
leading experts in the field summarizes the state of the art in the fol-
lowing way: 
By combining fMRI with pattern recognition, the field of “brain 
reading” has made huge progress in the last few years. It has been 
possible to read out very detailed contents of a person’s thoughts, 
including detailed visual percepts and ideas, memories, and even 
intentions and emotions. It is possible to read out implicit and even 
unconscious mental states, such as unconscious percepts and deci-
sions. ([Haynes 2012], p. 2) 
It is hardly surprising that this research has led to rather strong 
claims and expectations (hopes as well as fears) in society, as expressed 
in popular media (Broeke, 2011, 2014; Roth, 2009; Sample, 2012; 
Wolpe, 2009). Different assessments, ranging from extreme skepticism 
to outright science fiction, about current possibilities and future poten-
tial, have obscured philosophical and societal analyses and debates. 
However, in actual practice brain reading encounters substantial chal-
lenges. Most applications are currently far from being sufficiently reli-
able or practically useful (a framework for the assessment of brain read-
ing applicability can be found in (Mecacci & Haselager, n.d.), submit-
ted). 
 
BUT, IS IT READING? 
Some questions can be raised regarding the extent to which 
‘reading’ actually applies to the process of brain reading. Here, we will 
focus on two aspects in particular, syntax and semantics, starting with 
the latter. 
Semantics 
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Regarding semantics, one of the crucial questions is the extent 
to which brain measurements can currently give access to mental con-
tent. That is, to what extent do brain measurements enable the interpre-
tation of what someone’s thought is about, or the experiential nature of 
someone’s feeling? Can the process currently provide with a detailed 
understanding of one’s thoughts, similar to what we could get by di-
rectly asking that person, or are its results more akin to an educated 
guess of what might be going on in somebody’s mind at a much more 
general and abstract level? Using the representational terminology in-
troduced above, there is a difference between understanding a brain 
state’s meaning (accessing the content) and simply categorizing the ve-
hicles that carry it. Those could be considered different points of the 
same continuum: categorizing vehicles is one of the first steps towards 
fully understanding meaning. An example to illustrate this continuum 
could be the following: consider a person that is exposed to a system of 
signs (vehicles) of a language she does not understand (in our case, for 
instance, Japanese). In the beginning, that person can only distinguish 
them from one another, on the basis of their shape. She has no idea, 
though, about their meaning. Give that person a pocket vocabulary, and 
she will start being able to categorize the signs she can recognize, con-
necting them to some meaning. Due to the limitations of her short man-
ual, her understanding will be limited, superficial and prone to mis-
takes. Several years later, after spending some time in Japan, and stud-
ying the language extensively, she might have developed a rich and us-
able understanding of the Japanese language. Metaphorically, current 
brain reading is passing from the stage of distinguishing between vehi-
cles to the stage our language learner was when she acquired her first 
vocabulary. The pocket vocabulary for the brain reader is still small and 
oftentimes very general, in the sense that only relatively high level se-
mantic categories can be distinguished. That is, brain reading methods 
can currently recognize -and discriminate among- a rather limited num-
ber of vehicles (brain states), and the meaning (mental states) those ve-
hicles can be connected to, is often abstract and little detailed. It is 
therefore not surprising to find the same expert quoted above softening 
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his earlier claim to such an extent that it appears to come close to re-
tracting it: 
Currently, it is not possible to directly “read” the “language” of 
the brain, that is, to identify mental states based on a systematic 
interpretation of the corresponding brain states.” ([Haynes 
2012], p. 3) 
On the basis of our analysis, we have to disagree with his state-
ment on p.2 (“It has been possible to read out very detailed contents of 
a person’s thoughts”), but we can agree with his statement on p.3. 
 
Syntax 
In relation to syntax, the question is whether or to what extent 
brain reading techniques enable to access the constituent structure (J. 
Fodor, 1975; J. A. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) of concatenations of sym-
bols. That is: can an algorithm be trained such that a reliable distinction 
can be made between an unstructured collection of representations, and 
a proper syntactical structural relation between representations. As the 
standard example goes: there is a difference between ‘There is some-
thing about John, Mary, and love’, and ‘John loves Mary’. The first 
case (the unstructured collection of representations) does not provide 
information about who loves and who is loved, but the second case 
does. Similarly, there is a difference between ‘John loves Mary’ and 
‘Mary loves John’. Combinatorial syntax enables to distinguish be-
tween the latter two sentences, and hence to distinguish their (poten-
tially dramatically) different meanings. 
Huth et al. investigated how the meaning of language is repre-
sented in the brain. In principle, claim the authors, this “suggests that 
the contents of thought, or internal speech, might be decoded” (Huth et 
al., 2016). The scientists identified -with variable margins of error- dif-
ferent cortical areas that encode for semantic mental states belonging 
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to 12 semantic domains, such as e.g. ‘person’, ‘visual’ or ‘time’. Alt-
hough these results constitute a remarkable advance in neuroscientific 
research, the degree of abstractness and the number of states the scien-
tists were able to discriminate with reasonable reliability are far re-
moved from what we could commonly intend by the concept of ‘read-
ing’, where a reader is fully competent on a certain language, and ca-
pable of understanding the meaning of a large corpus of sentences. 
Even if it is possible to access to some extent to the meanings of indi-
vidual representations (but see the point about meaning above), there is 
no evidence that the further question of addressing syntax, i.e. the struc-
tural relations between semantic elements, can be captured via current 
brain reading techniques. Hence, we have to disagree with Huth et al.’s 
claim that the contents of internal speech can be grasped, until it has 
been shown that not only representations belonging to different seman-
tic categories can be read out, but also the combinatorial syntax com-
bining them into meaningful statements (sentences or propositions). 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT LIMITATIONS OF 
BRAIN READING 
Pardo & Patterson ([Pardo & Patterson 2013], chapter 6) discuss 
how neuroscientific evidence could potentially be used against criminal 
defendants, and how constitutional provisions can protect defendants 
by limiting government evidence gathering. Specifically, they discuss 
the 4th and 5th amendments to the United States Constitution, that re-
spectively prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures and provide 
privilege against self-incrimination. We would like to focus on their 
discussion of the 5th amendment to investigate what the consequences 
are of our analysis of brain reading. 
Regarding the 5th amendment, Pardo & Patterson say (p.162) 
that it offers protection for defendants in case of attempts to procure 
evidence that meets three formal requirements: 1) compelled, 2) incrim-
inating, and 3) testimonial communications. Compulsion would be the 
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case when a suspect for instance is forced physically (or through 
threats) to undergo fMRI or EEG scanning. Incrimination is the case 
when the obtained information will be used in a criminal prosecution 
of the defendant, e.g. when the results of brain reading would be used 
as evidence that the defendant committed a crime. The 3rd requirement 
(testimonial) is the most interesting, but also quite complex. We give 
only the upshot of Pardo & Patterson’s analysis here. In their view, ba-
sically the 5th amendment does not protect the physical instantiations of 
a ‘testimony’ (e.g. a document or a recording of a statement in itself), 
but what gets expressed in them (i.e. the mental content that finds its 
physical instantiation through a document or recording). In other 
words, it is the content of a mind (p.165) that makes a document or 
recording ‘testimonial’. It is because of this that the 5th amendment of-
fers protection against unwarranted access to documents or recordings 
reflecting mental content, because accessing them would constitute 
self-incrimination. As they say: 
the scope of the privilege turns on whether the government is mak-
ing incriminating use of the contents of the defendants’ mental 
states [...]. In focusing on the content of mental states, the privilege 
appears to focus on what philosophers refer to as ‘propositional at-
titudes’ […]. The privilege appears to apply to the content of these 
propositions […] and limits the government from making com-
pelled, incriminating use of them. (p. 165-166). 
Given our analysis above, the emphasis on access to mental con-
tent has an interesting consequence for the scope of the 5th amendment 
regarding brain reading. To the extent that current brain reading is still 
mainly coming down to classifying vehicles and only limitedly capable 
of accessing (decoding, interpreting) the content of mental states, the 
5th amendment does not seem to offer protection. In other words, in the 
continuum that goes from mere discrimination of signs, to full under-
standing of meaning (content), brain reading methods are arguably still 
very close to the former side. In as far as this is the case, the safeguard-
ing of mental content by the 5th amendment, might just not apply. 
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However, when brain reading technology would provide a sub-
stantially more detailed access to the content of mental states, by in-
cluding more semantic domains at much finer levels of detail, and man-
aging to capture syntax (i.e. capture the structural relations between 
representations to combine them into an overall proposition), then the 
data provided would start to fall under the 5th amendment tutelage. In 
short, current brain reading technology may fall outside of the scope of 
the privilege that the 5th amendment affords defendants precisely be-
cause of its current shortcomings, and only as long as these last. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Brain reading technology is developing fast, but, despite certain 
claims about success, it is doubtful whether current applications actu-
ally amount to the ‘reading’ of mental content in a full sense of the 
word. Rather, today’s brain reading technology appears to engage in a 
kind of ‘vehicle’ classification that barely provides with loose and 
highly abstract interpretations of mental content. Legally, this may im-
ply that information obtained through current brain reading technology 
falls outside of the scope of the 5th amendment, at least as analyzed by 
Pardo & Patterson. That said however, progress in brain reading is very 
fast. It is therefore recommendable to consider the aspects of syntax 
and semantics, discussed above, as challenges for brain reading rather 
than as definite obstacles. The applicability of legal safeguards regard-
ing unwarranted access to mental content is in need of constant re-eval-
uation. The safeguards themselves may need significant revision in 
light of neuroscientific progress in order to remain societally relevant. 
Given the enormous potential consequences of brain reading, it is cru-
cial to keep track of its practical challenges and progress.
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INTRODUCTION 
Mind reading is as old as social interaction. In daily life, we are 
constantly trying to understand the beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings 
and capacities of other agents (either human or animal). Traditionally, 
informal observation of an agent’s behavior (including language pro-
duction) provided the sole basis for the ascription of mental states. In 
the last century, such informal approach has been gradually comple-
mented, and sometimes replaced, by systematic psychological observa-
tion and testing. These methods were introduced and commonly em-
ployed to assess an individual’s mental health, or potential for educa-
tion and career (Gross, 1962). Over the last decades, brain measure-
ments have become a further source of information. They can be used 
to diagnose pathologies, develop cognitive theories, drive software or 
hardware devices, or to infer the occurrence and nature of certain men-
tal states. Inferences regarding the occurrence and nature of mental 
states have recently been referred to as ‘brain reading’(J.-D. Haynes, 
2012): the observation of brain structure and/or activity aimed at ob-
taining insights about mental states. This additional possibility might 
have significant implications for the private character of mind, at least 
in principle challenging the widely shared intuition that our mental 
states can be secluded. Ayer ((Ayer, 1963), chapter 3) distinguished at 
least four ways in which our mental states can be said to be private9. 
First, they are private in the sense they can be incommunicable. People 
can experience insurmountable difficulties in adequately expressing 
their thoughts or feelings. There is, or there can be, a felt difference 
between the report and the experience of what is reported. Second, 
mental states are private in the sense they grant special access to a given 
person. One knows introspectively about one’s own mental states, 
which is different from the way anyone else can know about them. In 
other words, there is a qualitative component that is inaccessible to an 
external viewer. Third, mental states are private in the sense they can 
                                                 
9 These features were also discussed by Rorty (Rorty, 1970) when he con-
sidered whether they could be taken as special features (‘marks’) of the mental. 
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be unshareable, meaning that it is impossible for two persons to enter-
tain exactly the same thought in exactly the same way. Fourth, mental 
states are private in the sense they can be incorrigible, for certain 
knowledge claims cannot be corrected or overridden. There seems to 
be no way to categorically deny subjective reports of thoughts and sen-
sations. “That’s how I feel it” is a statement that, in many cases, invokes 
an unassailable authority regarding one’s own mental life. 
Brain reading’s potential implications for mental privacy have 
recently captured the interest of both popular (Roth, 2009; Sample, 
2012; Wolpe, 2009) and scientific (Farah et al., 2009; J.-D. Haynes, 
2012; Shen, 2013) press, generating hype and expectations (hopes as 
well as fears) in society. On the one, hand brain reading technology 
might lead to a number of exciting clinical and scientific advances. On 
the other hand, though, it could generate a number of ethical concerns, 
from the potential use and abuse of collected personal data (Ienca & 
Haselager, 2016) to Orwellian scenarios where peoples’ liberties are at 
stake (Ienca & Andorno, 2017) and minds can be coercively or covertly 
monitored (Federspiel, 2007). For instance, as Shen reports, one of the 
questions that is commonly discussed in newspapers and mass media is 
whether ‘brain science [will] be used by the government to access the 
most private of spaces—our minds—against our wills’ ((Shen, 2013), 
p. 654). It is not difficult to imagine how the possibility to extract 
thoughts from the brain without appealing to behavioral cues can be 
unsettling. Mental privacy infringement has been discussed earlier in 
relation to psychological profiling and polygraph testing (Black, 1994; 
Hermann, n.d.). Those techniques aim at mind reading without directly 
accessing brain functioning. Contemporary technologies that monitor 
brain activity constitute a significant addition to those indirect tech-
niques in that they can establish an explicit relationship between psy-
chological processes and the underlying neural events. If one accepts 
the assumption that every mental state must be implemented by some 
neural mechanism, then the observation of the causal machinery under-
lying thought and feeling may be considered by some to be a good or 
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even compelling reason to override the traditionally decisive first-per-
son reports. This could be further strengthened by the potentially supe-
rior performance of brain reading methods over classic investigation 
techniques. In addition, direct observation of the brain could lead, at 
least in principle, to access a significantly vaster or more detailed array 
of mental states. 
However, it is far from clear that the unsettling consequences 
sketched in media may actually take place within a reasonable time 
frame. The technical and theoretical challenges for brain reading are 
enormous. Indeed, it is not difficult to find contrasting claims regarding 
the achievements of brain reading within the same paper (J.-D. Haynes, 
2012). That said, it is also important to discuss potential implications 
of a technology that is still in its infancy, if only to avoid being too late 
with e.g. regulations regarding it. Ideally, discussions about the poten-
tial implications of brain reading should take place in parallel with, and 
not after, the development of the technology. Therefore, this paper aims 
at equipping ethicists and policy makers with conceptual tools to sup-
port an evaluation of the potential applicability and the implications of 
current and near future10 brain reading technology. We devise an eval-
uative framework that is composed of five criteria–accuracy, reliability, 
informativity, concealability and enforceability–aimed at enabling a 
clearer estimation of the degree to which a certain technology could be 
realistically deployed contexts where mental privacy could be at stake. 
A proper understanding of brain reading methods, their potential and 
their limits, maximizes the chances to timely assess and address emerg-
ing ethical, legal and societal implications. 
 
                                                 
10 With ‘current’ we are referring to currently (as of 2017) existing applica-
tions, with ‘near-future’ we mean approximately applications that might come into 
existence in the next 5-10 years, based on currently ongoing research. 
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BRAIN MEASUREMENTS, MIND READING AND 
BRAIN READING 
In this section, we aim to explain some basics about brain read-
ing methods and technologies11 and provide a clear terminology to talk 
about them. In order to understand what brain reading is, we should 
start from the more general category of ‘brain measuring’12. With that 
term, we denote any process or technology aimed at obtaining infor-
mation about the brain and/or its functioning, from direct observation 
(e.g. autopsies or exploratory surgery), to modern imaging technologies 
(e.g. magnetic resonance imaging). Brain measurements are useful in 
at least four domains of application. The first one is the production of 
physiological and pathological models and theories. This is of im-
portance to address clinical cases and advance medical knowledge. A 
second domain where brain measurements can play a role is the devel-
opment of cognitive theories. Although cognition could in principle be 
studied independently from the specific structures that realize it–be it a 
brain, a chip, or whatnot–, observing how the brain works can contrib-
ute to inform and/or constrain cognitive theories. Information about the 
brain can provide inspiration for producing biologically plausible cog-
nitive models. A third domain where brain measurements are central is 
Brain-Computer Interfacing. Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are 
technologies aimed at “utilizing” brain signals to command a software 
or hardware device (e.g. to control the movement of a cursor on a com-
                                                 
11 The words ‘method’ and ‘technology’ are not synonymous. Where a 
method is properly a comprehensive set of procedures or techniques and the con-
nected theoretical knowledge, the word ‘technology’ puts a stronger accent to the ma-
terial device that makes a certain task possible. However, we decided for simplicity’s 
sake to use the two terms interchangeably. 
12 It is important to note that the concept of brain reading has been used in 
the literature with different degrees of generality. For instance, where Shen uses it in 
a more liberal fashion to include any form of brain measurement (Shen, 2013), 
Haynes tends to equal it to the concept of brain decoding (J.-D. Haynes, 2012). Since 
we aim at conceptual clarification, we will use ‘brain measurement’ for the most gen-
eral version and ‘brain reading’ only for those applications aimed at decoding (clas-
sifying and interpreting) mental states. 
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puter screen). In BCI a machine learning algorithm recognizes and cat-
egorizes, an arbitrary, preferably easy to evoke and measure, neural ac-
tivity pattern. The particular kind or nature of the mental state that is 
correlated to such activity need not be relevant as long as it can reliably 
be used to drive the system13. Finally, brain measurements can be used 
as brain reading: a brain measurement aimed at mind reading. Brain 
reading, though sharing numerous techniques with BCI, differs from it 
in its main scope. Rather than utilizing brain markers as inputs for a 
device, brain reading aims at understanding the way thoughts are rep-
resented in the brain. That is, brain measurements are used to decode 
or interpret mental states (assess their nature and/or content). As sug-
gested by the very word ‘reading’, brain reading is based on interpreting 
(combinations of) neuronal signs and drawing inferences about their 
meaning. As indicated, traditional mind reading activity relies on be-
havioral observation and inferential processes. Brain reading technol-
ogy allows to replace behavior with measurements of the brain structure 
and/or activity. Assuming a correlation between brain structure and 
functions and mental states, the latter can be inferred from the observa-
tion of the former. 
In this paper, we use the concept of ‘mental state’ in a rather 
broad fashion to encompass every aspect of an individual’s psychology, 
including, but not limited to, personality traits and dispositions (e.g. 
sexual preferences, personal tastes and habits…), qualitative states (e.g. 
perceptions, emotions, feelings…), propositional states (e.g. 
knowledge, beliefs), intentions and goals, plans, memories etc. How-
ever, we should keep an important distinction in mind. On the one hand, 
we have traits that are relatively permanent dispositional psychological 
qualities, characteristics of individuals. On the other hand, we have oc-
current mental states, the states that are entertained or experienced by 
a subject at a particular moment in time. Psychological traits enable and 
                                                 
13 BCI can also be said to entail implications for mental privacy (Ienca & 
Haselager, 2016; Klein, 2016). However, strictly speaking, working with BCIs in it-
self need not require to interpret the brain signals in terms of mental states. 
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dispose a subject towards entertaining a certain occurrent mental state. 
For instance, having a high degree of trait anxiety makes a subject more 
vulnerable to experiencing anxiety in a variety of contexts and situa-
tions. Traits are also conceivable as capacities or enabling conditions. 
For instance, having a certain degree of self-control is a trait that makes 
a subject capable of displaying self-control in certain situations where 
other subjects might be unable to. In the remainder, we will talk about 
mental states in general to refer to both traits and occurrent states, un-
less otherwise specified. 
 
Figure 1. Different applications of brain measurement 
A further important distinction is that between apparent and 
non-apparent mental states: apparent mental states are those that can be 
identified by mere external observation of behavior, thanks to normal 
human mind reading capacities, e.g. by seeing trembling hands infer-
ring that someone is nervous. Non-apparent mental states, instead, are 
concealed from external observation. Furthermore, different technolo-
gies have been developed to identify both apparent and non-apparent 
mental states without appealing to human mind reading capacities. 
Identification of apparent mental states can for instance be automatized 
by using deep learning techniques for feature recognition (Güçlütürk, 
Güçlü, van Gerven, & van Lier, 2016), achieving performances that can 
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get close to, or become better than, human ones. Applied to brain read-
ing, such methods offer, at least in principle, an additional window on 
apparent mental states, potentially more penetrating than introspection 
or external observation. Brain reading methods can also offer distinc-
tive insight into non-apparent mental states and this could make those 
methods particularly relevant from e.g. a clinical perspective (e.g. as-
sisting psychotherapy by providing a better understanding of a patient’s 
psychological complexities), but also more compelling from an ethical, 
legal and societal perspective. Existing methods, such as the polygraph 
(Vicianova, 2015), infrared thermal imaging (Park, Suk, Hwang, & 
Lee, 2013) and voice stress analysis (Ruiz, Legros, & Guell, 1990), 
sport principled limits when compared to brain reading technology. 
They typically only allow to detect the presence of a generic physiolog-
ical alteration, commonly associated–to different extent–to particularly 
compelling emotional states. Technologies that directly record neural 
dynamics could provide significantly more detailed information about 
one’s apparent and non-apparent states of mind. 
Different mental states can be assessed with different brain 
reading methods. In assessing traits, as said, brain measurements can 
reveal to a certain extent the presence -or the probability thereof- of 
certain features that characterize or underlie attributes or behavioral 
dispositions of a person (Ma et al., 2014), such as intelligence (Malpas 
et al., 2016), self-control (Krämer & Gruber, 2015; Maier, Makwana, 
& Hare, 2015), sexual orientation (Habermeyer et al., 2013; Poeppl et 
al., 2015; Ponseti, 2012) etc. This can be done either by checking for 
certain brain anatomical features (through either neurobiological anal-
ysis or by the means of structural imaging technologies), or by identi-
fying characteristic patterns of neural activation that can be associated 
to certain traits. An organic anomaly, a tumor, a stroke, or just a partic-
ular feature of the cerebral tissue (such as e.g. the amount of white mat-
ter in a particular neural pathway), might contribute to inferring an in-
dividual’s (in)capacity to display a certain behavior, e.g. to maintain a 
conduct that is considered to be normal. For instance, Motzkin et al. 
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suggest that “psychopathy is associated with reduced structural integ-
rity in the right uncinated fasciculus” (Motzkin, Newman, Kiehl, & 
Koenigs, 2011). In healthy brains, structural and neurobiological mark-
ers such as e.g. density or connectivity of the neural tissue in certain 
areas, could be found to predict the presence of certain cognitive traits 
(Bernardi et al., 2014) (similar processes have been famously applied 
in genetics (Farahany, 2016; Illes & Racine, 2005; Rigoni et al., 2010)). 
If traits can be in principle found out to be connected to both structural 
or functional neural features, occurrent mental states are connected to 
brain activity itself. Those states are defined as temporary functional 
states of the brain, and are often identified through functional neuroim-
aging technology that allows to monitor, classify and interpret the neu-
ral activity. Different functional methods have been so far applied to 
the investigation of numerous mental states such as, but not limited to, 
intentions (Bode et al., 2013; Bode, Bogler, Soon, & Haynes, 2012; J. 
D. Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008, 2013), visual perceptions 
(Kay et al., 2008; Nishimoto et al., 2011; Schoenmakers et al., 2013), 
memories (Peth et al., 2015), active semantic knowledge (Carlson, 
Simmons, Kriegeskorte, & Slevc, 2014; Huth et al., 2016; Huth, 
Nishimoto, Vu, & Gallant, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2008), emotions (Huis 
in ‘t Veld & de Gelder, 2015; Plassmann et al., 2008), political 
preferences (Lamme, 2010), dreams (Horikawa et al., 2013), pain 
(Cowen et al., 2015; Reardon, 2015; Salmanowitz, 2015; Wager et al., 
2013), and (levels of) consciousness (Blume et al., 2015). 
The general approach could be simplified as follows (see also 
e.g. (Poldrack & Farah, 2015)). A brain monitoring device (e.g. EEG, 
fMRI…) is used to collect information about a person’s neural activity 
that co-occurs with the expression of (a) certain mental state(s). Once 
the data has been recorded, different statistical methods and machine 
learning techniques allow to analyze the collected information and cre-
ate a representational map that connects the targeted mental states to 
the concurrent neural events. The mapped associations between the tar-
geted mental states and the neural activity are learned and generalized 
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to a certain extent. Once this procedure is complete and successful, one 
can apply the trained algorithm to categorize and decode mental states 
on the basis of the observation of the neural activity measurements. 
 
ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF BRAIN READ-
ING APPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL PRIVACY  
Having a clearer idea of what brain reading can and cannot do, 
is important to form an opinion on whether, when and to what extent it 
could be applied, both now and in the near future, and at what point 
specific concerns may become relevant or urgent. Whether or not a cer-
tain technology might be adopted for certain applications, depends on 
numerous contingent factors, and drawing a complete model would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we isolate five important fac-
tors that might influence brain reading’s practical adoption, especially 
in those contexts where mental privacy is at stake: accuracy, reliability, 
informativity, concealability and enforceability. Unlike e.g. factors like 
price, availability, hype etc. (on which we will not focus in this paper), 
these five factors are bound to technical and theoretical limits and pos-
sibilities. They are meant to assist stakeholders with different back-
grounds in understanding and realistically evaluating future advances 
of brain reading, and the potential opening of novel practical applica-
tions. For policy makers in particular, these five principles could aid 
the production of scientifically informed guidelines. In those cases 
where that, for different reasons, would not be achievable, those criteria 
should at least allow non-experts in asking relevant and meaningful 
questions. 
In order to be considered for adoption in those contexts where 
possible implications for mental privacy might occur, brain reading 
methods must achieve certain performance standards. Different con-
texts of application will have different requirements. Evaluating the 
performance of a certain technology can become a rather technical 
question, and moreover one that can become quickly outdated because 
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of ongoing research and development. The notion of performance is 
well known to experts in neuroimaging, and is commonly divided into 
two components, accuracy and reliability. We propose to add a third 
one, informativity. While accuracy and reliability have to do with how 
well a certain method can read what is meant to read, informativity con-
cerns the relevance the obtainable data has for the practical purposes 
for which the method is meant to be used. Two more criteria, that spe-
cifically make sense in relation to those scenarios where the main pre-
occupation could be the violation of mental privacy and civil rights, are 
concealability and enforceability. While the former concerns the degree 
with which a certain brain reading method can be concealed from an 
individual’s perception or awareness, the latter regards the extent to 
which a method can be used against somebody’s will. 
Accuracy, reliability, informativity 
Accuracy can be represented as the percentage of times a certain 
method correctly identifies a state of mind14. Here, it is important to 
consider that in certain cases the specific types of error reducing the 
accuracy matter a great deal. In particular, the relative presence of false 
positives and false negatives can be of great importance in relation to 
certain contexts of application, e.g. in law. Whereas a court might be 
inclined to risk by admitting a method that can lead to a small percent-
age of false negatives, it might be less willing to base a decision on or 
even just consider a method that is prone to false positives, which could 
imply convicting an innocent. 
The concept of reliability expresses the extent to which the 
method’s results (e.g. identification of a particular trait) remain unal-
tered over time and across different subjects. Achieving high reliability 
                                                 
14 In brain reading, establishing the correctness of a certain result often im-
plies subjective validation, i.e. asking the subject to confirm whether her mental state 
was really the one the system identified. 
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usually represents a challenge, given the plasticity of individual brains 
and the large differences that can exist between different subjects. 
When considering performance in the context of practical ap-
plicability, accuracy and reliability are not the only important criteria. 
It is also essential to capture and express how relevant the outcomes of 
a certain technology or method can be for a specific application. This 
question regards the amount and nature of the information that can be 
obtained through brain reading, rather than its correctness. We express 
this with the concept of informativity. Informativity regards the amount 
of produced information relevant for the purposes at hand. Whereas ac-
curacy can be expressed quantitatively, informativity is a qualitative 
measure that depends on the question one wants to answer. Factors like 
number, kind and level of detail with which mental states can be iden-
tified, are all important in evaluating how informative, and hence po-
tentially applicable, a certain method can be for a given scope. For in-
stance, Huth et al. investigated how the meaning of language is repre-
sented in the brain. The outcomes of this study go so far as to suggest 
that “the contents of thought, or internal speech, might be decoded” 
(Huth et al., 2016). Huth et al. indicate that different cortical areas en-
code with variable accuracy for semantic mental states belonging to 12 
semantic domains, such as e.g. ‘person’, ‘visual’ or ‘time’. Their results 
constitute a remarkable advance in neuroscientific research. However, 
the degree of abstractness and the number of states they were able to 
discriminate would be a major discussion point in considering current 
practical applicability. Although this method could be used to gain 
some insight in whether a subject is in a certain moment thinking of one 
of the 12 categories (e.g. a person or a car), it is currently unclear 
whether one could be able to determine which car or which person. 
Those details may indeed be represented in the brain by different pat-
terns of activity, but with the current method, cutting edge as it is, this 
cannot be discriminated. 
The three aforementioned criteria constitute a coherent set that 
is worth discussing in more detail before continuing with the other two 
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criteria. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, evaluating the 
performance makes sense only in relation to any particular context of 
application. Different contexts might have different requirements in re-
gard to level of trustworthiness, type and quantity of the provided in-
formation. In contexts where the stakes are extremely high, such as 
criminal law, very high levels of performance will be required before 
its results can be taken into account. There, the information obtained by 
brain reading technology is required to be both very accurate (some-
times beyond any reasonable doubt), and informative regarding the 
question at issue. We want to discuss a practical scenario that considers 
a brain reading method that promises the challenging and societally rel-
evant capacity to identify pedophilic subjects. That particular sexual 
preference, for its social significance and its potential legal conse-
quences, can be, and normally is, concealed by the subjects entertaining 
it. In a recent experiment, Ponseti et al.’s (Ponseti, 2012) used fMRI to 
identify admitting15 pedophilic subjects by detecting states of sexual 
arousal in brain activity. They monitored the subjects’ reactions to the 
presentation of pictures of potential sexual partners of different gender 
and age. In terms of accuracy, 95% of the subjects were correctly clas-
sified, and the classification produced no false positives. The perfor-
mance remained solid across the subjects included in the investigation, 
although the reliability over time within a subject has to our knowledge 
not yet been assessed. The relatively high performance may be due to 
the fact that this particular method, rather than e.g. identifying the neu-
ral correlates of the different sexual preferences, indirectly infers sexual 
preferences by discriminating a general state of arousal against a base-
line. It is on the nature of the presented pictures, the evoking stimuli, 
that the inference about a certain sexual preference is drawn. The level 
of detail and the amount of relevant information obtainable in this way 
is such that some practical applications are foreseeable. For instance, it 
would be a useful tool in therapeutic or rehabilitative contexts, e.g. to 
monitor patients’ or convicts’ response to therapy. However, in other 
                                                 
15 We will see in a later section why the subjects’ admission is not a detail. 
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contexts, such as e.g. criminal law, this method’s performance might 
still be considered insufficient. 
To our knowledge, this brain reading based method to assess 
pedophilic tendencies has never been proposed in court, but consider-
ing the law’s reflection on an older technology provides some insights. 
The one century old penile plethysmography (or phallometry) is a tech-
nology that aims at detecting states of sexual arousal. Rather than di-
rectly measuring neural events, it detects variations in penis’ diameter 
or volume. It is known to have average accuracy comparable to that of 
Ponseti et al’s method16. Yet, phallometry has been previously deemed 
unacceptable as evidence in the American Common Law (see e.g. U.S. 
v. Powers (United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995), 
n.d.)).17 The fact that the performance of the two methods is similar, 
both in the nature of the information provided and in the overall accu-
racy, may be taken to suggest that the brain reading based method will 
not be accepted in court as well, based on purely performance based 
criteria18. In addition, the two methods have been claimed to show dif-
ferent proneness to false positives and false negatives. In the discussion 
of their paper, Ponseti et al. maintain that their method produces no 
                                                 
16 The authors claim their method to be “somewhat” better, but the reported 
accuracy of phallometry varies across different studies. 
17 In this case it is important to consider the different proneness to false pos-
itives and false negatives. A court might be inclined to risk by admitting a method 
that can lead to a small percentage of false negatives. On the contrary, it might be less 
eager to base a decision on or even only consider a method that is prone to any false 
positive, which could imply convicting an innocent. 
18 American Common Law has codified criteria for legal admissibility of 
scientific evidence in general. Those guidelines have been produced by the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Berger, 2005) in cases like Daubert v. Merrel Dow 
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 579 (1993), n.d.). The 
Supreme Court outlined four criteria to evaluate “scientific validity - and thus the 
evidentiary relevance and reliability” of a certain technology, theory or method: (a) 
whether it can be, and has been, tested, (b) whether or not it has been peer reviewed 
and published in scientific journals, (c) the error rate (and therefore the reliability) of 
the methods involved and (d) the degree of general acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 
579 (1993), n.d.). 
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false positives while phallometry produces no false negatives (although 
it must be noticed that the accuracy of phallometric assessments is eval-
uated differently in different papers (Ponseti, 2012)). A further detail 
that has to be considered is that Ponseti et al.’s performance is achieved 
with fully admitting, fully cooperative subjects. As we will further dis-
cuss in the next section, with individuals that try to actively conceal 
their sexual preference, emotional and physiological reactions, the per-
formance would likely decrease to a significant extent (noticeably, this 
is also the case for classic phallometric assessments). 
In all, assessing the accuracy, reliability and informativity of a 
brain reading method in order to decide on the practical usability of its 
results (e.g. in legal cases) is a multi-faceted task that cannot be an-
swered in general, but requires highly context specific considerations. 
We now return to the remaining criteria, concealability and enforcea-
bility, that didn’t need to be taken into account in the legal scenario we 
analyzed above. However, the possibility to apply brain reading meth-
ods without or even against somebody’s consent is an important part in 
understanding and evaluating their practical applicability in those sce-
narios where mental privacy and civil rights are more at stake. 
Concealability and enforceability in non-cooperative scenarios 
The possibility of collecting personal data secretly or against 
somebody’s will is not a novel concern, and it has been discussed since 
the end of the 19th century. Warren & Brandeis, as early as 1890, were 
denouncing how “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise 
[…] invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and nu-
merous mechanical devices threaten[ed] to make good the prediction 
that "what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops."” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). It is worth reflecting on the 
extent to which brain reading could be used unbeknownst to a subject 
(a criterion that we will call concealability) or against somebody’s will 
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(its enforceability). These two aspects are especially relevant when con-
sidering potential abuses of the technology and the relative preventive 
strategies. 
Brain reading technology might to a certain extent be used with-
out an individual being aware of it, or even being aware that any brain 
measurement is taken at all. Different types of scenarios can be devised. 
In the most innocent, and perhaps most currently common one, personal 
information can be incidentally discovered in the course of conducting 
scientific research or medical interventions with completely aware and 
cooperative subjects. Incidental findings fall by definition beyond the 
scope of an intended application. Usually, these findings consist of pre-
viously undiagnosed neural pathologies, but can in principle regard as-
pects of one’s psychology as well. The extent to which the information 
obtained is passed to -or retained from- the subject is currently regu-
lated in different protocols and ethical guidelines of neuroimaging (Bos 
et al., 2016; Illes, 2006; Shoemaker et al., 2011). Findings need not to 
be accidental, for a malicious user could intentionally collect data that 
fall outside the scope of a particular application for which the subject 
has given expressed consent. This does not necessarily apply only to 
scientific studies but could also involve more common scenarios. One 
example concerns consumer-grade brain computer interfaces (Ienca et 
al., 2017). Small and relatively cheap EEG devices started circulating 
among the large public a few years ago (“Emotiv,” n.d., “Neurosky,” 
n.d.), marketed as hands-free controllers for gaming and computer ap-
plications. These appliances have the potential to be, and some actually 
already are, utilized to collect personal data without the user’s consent 
and awareness. Of course, for completeness sake, additional scenarios 
are possible, where ill-intended scientists use brain measurements of 
e.g. unconscious or partially conscious subjects without their consent, 
or use yet to be developed technologies enabling brain measurements 
of awake free moving subjects without being detected. As indicated 
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earlier, we restrict ourselves to more near-future brain reading applica-
tions and therefore refrain from discussing these more futuristic scenar-
ios. 
The above listed scenarios are sorted by their decreasing level 
of cooperativity from a subject. While in accidental findings a subject 
is actively following the experimenters’ requests, awake and unknow-
ing subjects behave normally and freely engage in a number of daily 
cognitive tasks. It is important to notice that the less a subject is actively 
cooperating in performing a certain mental task, the harder it generally 
becomes to collect meaningful data. Non-cooperation would likely lead 
to a significant decrease in performance, due to the general difficulty of 
discriminating neural process in a subject that is not actively focusing 
on a single task. 
A further step towards non-cooperation involves cases where 
subjects are well aware that a reading is happening, but actively try to 
defy the technology. Enforcing brain reading is not easy, as brain read-
ing methods, and particularly those that are based on functional assess-
ments (e.g. fMRI), are prone to different kinds of intentional disruption. 
The simplest way one could render results of a functional imaging 
method invalid would be by generating noise. Noise can be generated 
for instance by simple muscular movements. A sufficient level of noise 
would likely make the entire dataset unusable. Normally, this form of 
‘sabotage’ is relatively easy to discover, e.g. when one participants’ da-
taset contains significantly more noise than the datasets of other partic-
ipants (unless all the subjects aim to sabotage the brain reading pro-
cess). One could also deliberately refrain from producing the investi-
gated brain signals, e.g. by not performing the cognitive task accurately, 
or only some of the time, or by focusing on other cognitive tasks, en-
gaging in mind wandering, etc. Even simple shifts in attention have 
been shown to warp the way mental states are represented in the brain 
(Çukur, Nishimoto, Huth, & Gallant, 2013). Here, discovering the lack 
of cooperation may still be possible, but more difficult than in the case 
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of deliberate noise production19. Brain reading procedures can not only 
be sabotaged by a subject that is forced to undergo it. It is during re-
search and development that a technology becomes particularly vulner-
able to being misled or ‘boycotted’. The data collection phase is partic-
ularly sensitive in that regard: one or more research subjects might de-
clare full cooperation while covertly devising the process by deploying 
one of the mentioned sabotage strategies. This could be due for instance 
to privacy concerns and result from some kind of political activism20. 
At this particular stage, for many mental states there is no other way to 
know which ones are entertained by a subject but to ask for subjective 
reports and assume complete cooperation. When one is to map mental 
states to neural activity, any uncertainty about the former drastically 
reduces the chances of success. At the research stage, the performance 
of the method itself is assessed, and hence depends on, the cooperation 
and bona fide of experimental subjects. The process can be boycotted 
at different stages of the research phase itself, as any method commonly 
undergoes a number of validations and tests, all based on subjective 
reports. 
As mentioned while discussing Ponseti et al. and their study on 
sexual preferences, research professionals are well aware of the issues 
regarding different non-cooperative scenarios. Further research is 
needed to assess the extent to which the performance of brain reading 
methods can be preserved as subjects actively try to defy them. Ad-
vancements in neuroscience and technology might partially address 
those technical limitations. Neuroimaging research is for instance in-
creasingly recognizing the value of methods aimed at decoding mental 
states under more natural, ecological conditions (Nishimoto et al., 
                                                 
19 Similar concerns were valid already for classic techniques like polygraphic 
and psychological assessments. A subject, willing to deceive those methods, could 
learn how to control her physiological reactions (i.e. try to present a different signal), 
create confounds in the data by producing noise, or, in the case of questionnaires, to 
intentionally distort the outcome (Van Geert et al., 2016). 
20 Daniel C. Dennett suggested such a scenario in a private conversation 
(Padua, May 2016). 
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2011; Stansbury et al., 2013). Though it is hard to estimate any 
timeframe, this suggests that future technology might be increasingly 
resilient to all sorts of disruptions that typically affect non-cooperative 
scenarios. 
Non-cooperative scenarios can be considered with respect to the 
technical vulnerabilities involved, but they should also be analyzed 
with respect to their ethical and societal relevance. For instance, 
whether or not one should use such technology, if available, in what 
contexts, and to what extent, is object of intense discussion. In certain 
cases checking the veridicality of testimonies through neurotechnology 
may be argued to be justifiably enforced for ‘the common good’ 
(Vedder & Klaming, 2010). Contrary to the ‘for the common good’ rea-
soning, it has been argued that such scenarios could imply a violation 
of constitutional rights in certain legal systems ((Pardo & Patterson, 
2013), ch. 6). For instance, they might constitute an infringement of the 
4th and/or 5th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that protect respec-
tively against unreasonable searches and seizures and against self-in-
crimination. We refrain from producing ethical evaluations and recom-
mendations here, because we feel that, at this point, contributing to the 
creation of a framework that assists stakeholders in the debate is more 
constructive. With the conceptual framework outlined in this paper, we 
hope to contribute to a systematic discussion of such implications of 
brain reading. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Brain reading technology represents a contemporary approach 
to mind reading. In principle, it grants the ability to read concealed 
mental states, possibly without a subject’s awareness or even coopera-
tion. It would be important for a number of different stakeholders to be 
able to estimate the extent to which these possibilities are realistic, and 
the timeframe before they eventually become so. That is something 
which cannot be done once and for all. Rather, it takes constantly and 
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competently monitoring scientific and technological advancement. In 
order to be up to the task, ethicists, journalists and policy makers must 
be equipped with and agree upon reliable information and the appropri-
ate conceptual tools. A meaningful and well-informed debate would 
contribute to prevent unnecessary concern among the large public and 
allow the numerous interested stakeholders to timely and measuredly 
react to scientific and technological advances. It would also benefit 
neuroscientific research, as a more accurate understanding of the state 
of the art would contribute to maximize the confidence of institutions 
towards it. 
We provided an overview of five aspects that we believe are 
among the most important ones to influence the practical applicability 
of a brain reading technology in practical scenarios, especially where 
mental privacy and civil rights are a concern. These aspects–accuracy, 
reliability, informativity, concealability and enforceability–could be 
used as criteria to produce an estimate of whether, when and to what 
situations brain reading technology could be applicable. Those criteria 
depend in turn on numerous ethical, legal and technical factors. Our 
discussion is aimed to identify several basic coordinates through which 
stakeholders can orient themselves within this rapidly growing field of 
brain reading. Numerous areas, such as healthcare, education and law, 
to name but a few, could benefit or suffer from brain reading technol-
ogy’s novel possibilities. If this is the case for the present time, in the 
near future these possibilities are set to become even more compelling. 
We hope to promote general awareness of the basic concepts, criteria, 
methodology and applications of brain reading, and thereby facilitate a 
systematic discussion about its ethical, legal and societal implications.
 CONCLUSIONS  
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Through the cases discussed in this thesis, we meant to offer a 
perspective on the extent to which advances in neurotechnology and 
neuroscience have the power to affect what we called in the introduc-
tion the human self-image. The contributions we gave in the different 
chapters were always oriented towards reconciling such image (i.e. our 
rooted intuitions, values and social practices) to the novel, and some-
times unsettling implications that those scientific advances bring about. 
This attempt at integration and reconciliation does not reflect a ‘con-
servative’ attitude. On the contrary, we fully embrace the swift pace at 
which the brain sciences revolutionize our understanding of ourselves. 
Yet, we meant to show some of the ways in which a philosophical eth-
ical reflection can contribute to reconciling scientific progress with a 
human perspective when those two seem to collide. 
In the first two chapters, we talked about Deep Brain Stimula-
tion, one the currently most groundbreaking and promising neurotech-
nologies. We proposed that certain conceptions of our minds and selves 
could be related to the psychological discomfort-a sense of self-es-
trangement-that has been reported in certain clinical cases. We also 
suggested how those very conceptions could be manipulated, namely 
suggesting a more embedded embodied vision of our minds and selves, 
in order to potentially relieve some of that discomfort. Deep brain stim-
ulation is an exemplary case where neurotechnology challenges one of 
our most deeply rooted intuitions. It does that with disruptive power, 
bringing the sometimes otiose scholarly debate on mind and self from 
philosophy classes down to the reality of Parkinson's disease patients, 
their families, and the expectations of the society in which they live. 
This is not only the case for clinical and assistive technology, but ex-
tends to neuroenhancement technology, brain computer interfaces and 
neurostimulators that promise to improve cognitive capabilities, gener-
ating a number of societal implications and concerns. Our work on deep 
brain stimulation, drawing ideas from philosophy of mind and embed-
ded embodied cognition theory, admittedly presents a rather ambitious 
proposal. Besides the additional clarity that we meant to bring in the 
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understanding of certain clinical situations, perhaps already quite dar-
ing for a philosophical approach, we went so far as to suggest that phil-
osophical perspectives could be used to alleviate clinical symptoms. 
Our proposal is yet to be tested, but numerous colleagues around the 
world discussed it with us and provided an impressive number of ideas 
and perspectives, some encouraging and others constructively critical. 
In chapter 3 we discussed the extent to which scientific findings 
may have an impact on our everyday intuitions about freedom and re-
sponsibility. Some of those intuitions are foundational for society: large 
parts of our legal systems and social practices are grounded on them. In 
addition to general societal implications, there are also important indi-
vidual consequences, for it is also important for each of us to in our 
personal lives to feel and/or be free and responsible in the control of 
our actions, or at least that such freedom is possible. This is not, how-
ever, what in general is suggested we should learn from the data. A 
number of popular books have claimed that since our actions are dom-
inated by subconscious brain mechanisms, there is no free will. In our 
work, however, we refrained from following relatively simplistic argu-
ments and showed that complex and societally embedded concepts, 
such as that of freedom, can be understood in multiple ways. Different 
definitions could influence the way those concepts are operationalized 
in research as well as the way the results of that research are interpreted. 
Some neuroscientists have shown to be more sensitive to this issue than 
others, adopting precise, and sometimes remarkably "humble" defini-
tions of the kind of ‘free action’ they were studying. On the one hand 
such very constrained, unpretentious definitions can limit the societal 
relevance and narrow down the overall impact of the research. On the 
other hand, the advantage is that one can avoid ending up with misin-
terpretations of data or hasty conclusions. Sometimes the very experi-
mental results can point to the shortcomings of particular adopted def-
initions. In the experiment we commented upon, a condition of blind 
guessing was found to share substantial neural mechanisms with a con-
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dition that was taken to represent the archetypical ‘free action’. Philos-
ophers have for decades claimed that a certain kind of ‘free’ action, 
widely adopted in neuroscience after the Libet experiment, is nothing 
else than an unreasoned, pseudo-random action. This is indeed a ‘free 
action’, in some sense. Yet, we argue that such sense of ‘freedom’ is 
not the only possible one, and it is probably not even one of the most 
relevant ones. This becomes clearer when considering how legal sys-
tems are based upon a concept of free action that is centered on delib-
eration and responsibility. Deliberate, premeditated actions are there 
considered to entail more responsibility than impulsive and unreasoned 
actions, and lead to graver legal consequences. Legal systems value de-
liberation as an instrument that gives time and reason to refrain from 
acting. A deliberate and well-informed action, where reasons and con-
sequences have been clearly evaluated, makes an agent more involved 
in it and responsible for it. Differences in scientific and societal (e.g. 
legal) conceptions of freedom suggest that there seems to be different 
concepts of free action, and that studying one of those without consid-
ering the other ones, might lead to inability to generalize certain con-
clusions. Our study used empirical observations to support the idea that 
there could be multiple senses in which an action, and an agent, can be 
deemed free. The presence of responsibility and real consequences 
could be elements that have been overlooked in the classic Libet kind 
of free action. Our research, together with the further studies that it con-
tributed to generate, led us to hypothesize that different contexts (e.g. 
neuroscience, law, etc.) might not just appeal to different conceptions 
of freedom, but also compel agents to–perhaps unconsciously–endorse 
different intuitions of freedom. In other words, the intuition behind 
what makes an action free might be manipulated in subjects by manip-
ulating the context in which the 'free' actions take place. In particular, a 
study by Deutschländer et al. (Deutschländer, Pauen, & Haynes, 2017) 
provided evidence that certain intuitions of freedom in laypeople seem 
to appeal to the concept of free action operationalized by Libet. We are 
currently testing whether that intuition can be influenced by introducing 
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contextual elements–practically absent in Deutschländer et al. experi-
mental design–that include legal consequences and responsibility. On 
the one hand, there might be the Libet kind of conception and opera-
tionalization, where free actions entail no consequences and there is no 
responsibility involved, and on the other hand there could be something 
more akin to daily life and legal scenarios, where free actions entail a 
great deal of consequences. We expect subject to use one or the other 
of these two intuitions depending on the circumstances.  
Neuroethics and philosophical analysis in general have been 
used in this thesis with the main purpose of bridging potential gaps or 
collisions between science and society, reconciling scientific discover-
ies and technological possibilities with what we called the human self-
image. In the third chapter, we showed how freedom and brain mecha-
nisms might not necessarily exclude each other, perhaps thereby sooth-
ing certain concerns about the non-existence of free will. In the fourth 
and fifth chapter, we went into another one of the growing societal con-
cerns regarding neuroscience and neurotechnology. Current brain read-
ing technologies are able to acquire information about mental states. In 
principle, they seem to be able to violate the privacy of our minds and 
gain an objective perspective on our allegedly subjective mental states. 
To the extent this is actually feasible, it may entail a number of ethical, 
legal and societal implications. Those range from threats against per-
sonal data security to the potential deprivation of freedom of thought. 
One of the cases that we discussed was in relation to the 5th Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, that safeguards individuals from witnessing 
against themselves, and grants the right to refrain from answering ques-
tions that could incriminate them. Brain reading methods might in prin-
ciple be used to extract sensitive information without asking direct 
questions, and perhaps against an individual’s consent. However, we 
showed that current brain reading methods encounter significant chal-
lenges when it comes to recognizing certain semantical and syntactical 
aspects of mental states. That, in large part, prevents the technology to 
be able to decode the propositional content of thoughts, which happens 
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to be an important aspect of what the 5th amendment applies to. We 
concluded that, given the current limitations, the 5th amendment need 
not yet safeguard against the access to mental content that is granted by 
typical brain reading methods. This is however likely to change as sci-
ence and technology advance at fast pace. Those advances should be 
clearly and timely conveyed to the many different stakeholders, if we 
want to address societal implications shortly before they emerge instead 
of after the damage occurs. Our contribution, in this respect, consists in 
providing a relatively basic conceptual toolbox to understand the extent 
to which neuroimaging technology could realistically be applied to a 
number of different practical contexts where mental privacy is at stake. 
We identified and discussed five factors that in our view might be 
among the most important ones to influence the adoption of neuroim-
aging technology and methods in those contexts: accuracy, reliability, 
informativity, concealability and enforceability. These five factors can 
be used by a vast array of stakeholders, coming from different areas of 
expertise, as criteria to benchmark the applicability of brain reading 
methods to any given context. Those criteria should ultimately allow 
non-experts to give realistic assessments, or at least enable them to ask 
relevant questions to form their own conclusions. 
In our study, we limited ourselves to providing the criteria as 
tools for reasoning, and gave some examples of how to understand and 
use them. We were determined not to give evaluations ourselves, and 
to avoid taking sides. However, this was admittedly quite hard to do, 
but the highly contextual nature of this question does not allow for sim-
ple conclusions. Rather, it leaves room for a number of different ver-
dicts that different stakeholders might produce each from their own per-
spective, for instance by making use of the conceptual framework we 
provided. We also refrained from delving into detailed technical chal-
lenges of brain reading. Those factors, though of great practical im-
portance, would have been of minor interest for the highly diverse 
stakeholder audience our paper was meant to address. 
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All in all, our work was meant to use a philosophical approach 
to discuss the impact of neuroscience and neurotechnology for the hu-
man self-image, from social practices, to cultural values, to the deepest 
intuitions and beliefs we have of ourselves. As technology will not 
likely stop advancing, it is of paramount importance for the future to 
keep analyzing the societal implications of scientific research, identify 
points of collision and there contribute to a clarification of concerns and 
stimulate an open dialogue among the different stakeholders. This 
would facilitate a timely understanding of potential ensuing implica-
tions and allow science and society to cooperate and contribute to each 
other’s responsible growth. We hope that with our work we promoted 
such collaborative attitude and made a small step towards a fruitful and 
long-lasting dialogue between science and society.
 
 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Wetenschap en technologie zijn twee belangrijke factoren 
geweest die ten grondslag liggen aan de culturele veranderingen die de 
mensheid van het stenen tijdperk hebben gebracht naar het 
informatietijdperk. Binnen die ongeveer 200.000 jaar, vertonen de 
laatste paar millennia een explosieve verandering in menselijke 
samenlevingen. Wetenschap en technologie, ondersteunt/gestimuleerd 
door gunstige geografische en politieke omstandigheden, hebben 
voortdurend innovaties geïntroduceerd die alle aspecten van het 
menselijk leven ingrijpend beïnvloed hebben. Dankzij toenemende 
geavanceerde technologische instrumenten, kunnen de natuurkrachten 
geobserveerd, gemeten en uiteindelijk verklaard worden door 
wetenschappelijke theorieën die steeds grotere voorspellende waarde 
hebben. Diverse fenomenen, eenmaal verklaard door een beroep te 
doen op intuïtieve principes [not clear to me what you mean here and 
you use ‘increasing/progressive/growing/etc. too often] zijn 
‘genaturaliseerd’, en binnen het kader van ons wetenschappelijke 
wereldbeeld geplaatst. 
Deze toenemende naturalisatie heeft niet alleen onze visie op de 
fysieke wereld verandert, maar ook ons zelfbeeld. Vooruitgang in 
neurobiologie en neurofysiologie, ondersteunt door de toenemende 
beschikbaarheid van moderne hersenscan technologie, van optische 
microscopie tot aan magnetische resonantie afbeeldingen, hebben 
gedetailleerde kennis van hersenfuncties opgeleverd, en het mogelijk 
gemaakt om de menselijke geest (of tenminste onderdelen daarvan) te 
onderzoeken en bestuderen, vanuit wetenschappelijk perspectief. In de 
21e eeuw hebben functionele neuroafbeelding technologie en 
hersenstimulatie methoden het mogelijk gemaakt om de aard en 
aanwezigheid van mentale toestanden te veronderstellen en tot op 
zekere hoogte te manipuleren. Niet alleen kunnen we de aanwezigheid 
van mentale toestanden afleiden van hersenobservaties, maar ook 
daarop ingrijpen door te interfereren op het zenuwstelsel. 
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Neurowetenschap en neurotechnologie hebben wat ons 
‘zelfbeeld’ genoemd kan worden ingrijpend beïnvloedt. Ze hebben dat 
op tenminste twee manieren gedaan. Op een persoonlijk niveau hebben 
ze geleid tot het bevragen van traditionele opvattingen over onze geest 
en onszelf, uiteindelijk onze concepties van de menselijke natuur 
hervormend. Neuroafbeeldingen en neurostimulatie technologieën 
hebben een diep begrip van de structuur en functies van het brein 
opgeleverd, en licht geworpen op hoe mentale toestanden in het brein 
gerepresenteerd zijn. Niet alleen onze zelf-conceptie, maar ook onze 
zelf-perceptie is beïnvloed. Brein-computer interfaces kunnen iemands 
gevoel van handelen beïnvloeden, en tot misattributie van handelen 
leiden. Daarnaast kan hersenstimulatie aantoonbaar leiden tot 
veranderingen in iemands persoonlijkheid en effect hebben op 
zelfherkenning. Op maatschappelijk niveau zijn neurowetenschap en 
neurotechnologie van invloed geweest op diverse sociale en culturele 
waarden. Neurowetenschappelijke ontdekkingen over het functioneren 
van het brein hebben bijgedragen aan het bevragen van diep 
verankerende intuïties over onszelf als vrije handelaars, uiteindelijk 
effect hebbend op sociale en juridische praktijk van het toeschrijven 
van verantwoordelijkheid en blaam. Daarnaast kan de mogelijkheid tot 
het ‘lezen van hersenen’ onze laatste privésfeer bedreigen, onze geest 
publiek toegankelijk maken en daardoor een aantal maatschappelijke 
kwesties in verband met privacy en data beveiliging oproepen. 
Aannames en overtuigingen ter discussie stellen is op zichzelf 
een waardevol resultaat van goed wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Echter, 
een groot deel van onze maatschappij steunt op waarden en intuïties die 
soms haaks lijken te staan op de implicaties van een wetenschappelijk 
wereldbeeld. Een klassiek voorbeeld hiervan betreft het recht, waar het 
beeld van een verantwoordelijk beslissende, vrij handelende persoon, 
gezien kan worden als in strijd met het materialistische beeld dat uit 
neurowetenschappelijk onderzoek naar voren komt. Bovendien zijn 
hier waarden en gevoelens mee verbonden die mensen belangrijk 
vinden, en die het waard zouden kunnen zijn om in een of andere vorm 
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behouden te blijven. Deze mogelijke spanning tussen neurowetenschap 
en het menselijk zelfbeeld kan vergroot worden door het ontbreken van 
goede communicatie. Neurowetenschap en neurotechnologie, zowel in 
academische als publieke sfeer, zijn soms niet in staat om aan 
betrokkenen (vaak niet-experts) een helder beeld te geven van de stand 
van zaken. Deze betrokkenen, van massa media tot bestuursorganen tot 
belastingbetalende burgers, zijn normaliter en uiteindelijk degenen die 
de gevolgen van dit soort onderzoek ondergaan. Onvoldoende 
wederzijds begrip creëert mogelijk misverstanden die negatief kunnen 
zijn voor zowel de neurowetenschap als voor de maatschappij. Aan de 
ene kant zou neurowetenschap voor een deel het vertrouwen van de 
maatschappij kunnen verliezen, resulterend in verminderde financiële 
ondersteuning en algemene steun; aan de andere kant zou de 
maatschappij belangrijke klinische en praktische mogelijkheden 
kunnen mislopen die huidig en toekomstig onderzoek zou kunnen 
opleveren. 
In dit proefschrift bespreken we drie casussen waarin de 
mogelijke spanning tussen neurowetenschap en menselijk zelfbeeld 
duidelijk naar voren komt. Het werk draagt bij aan een wederzijds en 
constructief dialoog tussen de neurowetenschap en onze samenleving. 
Het hoofddoel: Het herkennen, voorkomen en resolveren/oplossen van 
situaties waarin wetenschappelijke resultaten en sociaal-
maatschappelijke normen en waarden botsen. De filosofische aanpak 
die dit proefschrift kenmerkt combineert een kritische, 
maatschappelijke bewuste houding typerend voor de 
geesteswetenschappen met de helderheid en grondigheid van de exacte 
wetenschappen. Om aan het hoofddoel bij te dragen bevat ons werk drie 
generieke, in onze opinie even belangrijke, deeldoelen. Het eerste 
deeldoel (Hoofdstuk 2) is een praktijkgericht begrip van de ethische, 
wettelijke en maatschappelijke consequenties van neurowetenschap en 
neurotechnologie. Het tweede deeldoel (Hoofdstuk 3) zijn conceptuele 
hulpmiddelen en criteria voor de ontwikkeling van op wetenschap 
gebaseerde ethische richtlijnen. Het derde en laatste deeldoel 
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(Hoofdstuk 4 en 5) is het stimuleren van een goed geïnformeerde 
discussie tussen de wetenschap en het algemene publiek over de 
mogelijke consequenties van neurowetenschap en neurotechnologie. 
De eerste twee hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift zijn gewijd aan 
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS: Diepe Hersen Stimulatie) en de 
psychologische veranderingen die mensen soms doormaken als gevolg 
van deze behandeling. Onze hypothese is dat, voor zover dit fenomeen 
een psychologische component bevat, het conceptueel raamwerk van 
een patiënt een rol kan spelen bij haar zelfbeeld. Hier van uitgaande, 
evalueren we wat de rol kan zijn van verschillende conceptuele 
raamwerken bij een maladaptief zelfbeeld bij een DBS-behandeling. In 
het bijzonder, we stellen dat een brein-centrisch raamwerk, waarin 
alleen het brein (en niets anders) verantwoordelijk is voor ieder 
cognitief fenomeen, kan bijdragen aan het psychologische leiden van 
patiënten na een DBS-behandeling. 
Het derde hoofdstuk betreft de vrije wil, een klassiek filosofisch 
debat waarbij neurowetenschap en neurotechnologie vrij recentelijk 
een unieke bijdrage heeft geleverd. Deze bijdrage kwam in de vorm van 
de ontdekking dat deterministische neurale mechanismen 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor cognitieve processen zoals beslissen en 
acteren. Dit heeft ertoe geleidt dat sommigen de conclusie trekken dat 
er geen ruimte is in het brein voor vrije wil. Wij pleiten voor een 
pragmatische blik op vrij acteren gebaseerd op verantwoordelijkheid. 
Hierbij staat centraal dat vrije wil voortkomt uit de redenen die mensen 
hebben om zich verantwoordelijk te gedragen. Vanuit dit perspectief 
lijkt het niet zonder meer mogelijk om  een aantal 
neurowetenschappelijke empirische resultaten in verband met vrij 
handelen, deels door de wijze waarop deze concepten zijn gedefinieerd 
en geoperationaliseerd, te vertalen naar direct relevante conclusie over 
vrije wil 
De vierde en vijfde hoofdstukken gaan over brain reading 
(hersen lezen) technologie. In de nabije toekomst zal deze 
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neurotechniek mogelijk veranderen welke van onze gedachten privé 
zijn, met ethische en juridische gevolgen. Onze discussie over dit 
onderwerp volgt twee gedachten. In het vierde hoofdstuk bekijken we 
in hoeverre de huidige technieken onze grondrechten zouden kunnen 
schenden. We bestuderen hoe het lezen van hersenen, beschouwd in het 
kader van het 5e amendement van de grondwet van de Verenigde Staten 
van Amerika, zou kunnen leiden tot zelfbeschuldiging. In het vijfde 
hoofdstuk presenteren we een raamwerk gebaseerd op vijf criteria 
waarmee hersen lees technieken kunnen worden geëvalueerd. Dit 
hoofdstuk heeft als doel om belanghebbenden die geen expert zijn, te 
voorzien van gebruiksklare hulpmiddelen, zodat zij een inschatting 
kunnen maken of, en wanneer brain reading technieken kunnen worden 
gebruikt. 
Met dit proefschrift hopen we dat we het bewustzijn hebben 
vergroot van sommige van de sociaal-maatschappelijke consequenties 
van neurowetenschap en neurotechniek. Daar waar 
neurowetenschappen en de maatschappij samenkomen ontstaat de 
gelegenheid om tot een dieper zelfbegrip te komen. Om te waarborgen 
dat deze samenkomst constructief is, zal de wetenschappelijke 
gemeenschap met de maatschappij in gesprek moeten blijven en daar 
zoveel mogelijk belanghebbenden bij moeten betrekken. Een dergelijk 
dialoog moet gegrond zijn in een gedeeld begrip van de fundamentele 
feiten en waarden. Dit is, volgens ons, wat uiteindelijk tot een werkelijk 
humane neurowetenschap zal leiden. 
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